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Abstract: Engaging with rhetorical studies, performance studies, and surveillance
studies, this thesis attempts to outline the ideological construction of the experience of iPhone,
underlining how this experience—and its performance—is imbricated with conceptions of social
control. To do this, I begin with the cultural oscillation between extreme psychological
attachment to Apple’s iPhone and its complementary disposability. How can an object generate
such attachment, yet remain disposable? To get at this question, I examine how attachment and
disposability are layered together in an experience of iPhone structured by rhetorics of
dematerialization. These are visual and discursive fragments that, together, construct an
ideological impulse that tends toward the disappearance of the objects to which they refer,
overall, working to supplement and promote iPhone’s culture of disposability. In relation to
iPhone, this thesis examines rhetorics of dematerialization through three intersecting vectors: the
device, the human user, and the proximal space that stages their interaction.
With rhetorics of dematerialization as the larger frame, my main analyses focus on
specific instances of the tension between attachment and disposability, considered as
performances of attachment. Generally, these are everyday performances on and with iPhone—
gestural interface, picking it up, throwing it out—that 1) collapse attachment and disposability
into each other under the rhetorical rubric of a phenomenal dematerialization, 2) require users to
enact, embody, and assume the rhetorics of dematerialization, and 3) have both cultural and
individual effects. iPhone’s culture of disposability relies on the dematerialization of waste and
wasteful consumer practices. Individually, performances of attachment with iPhone allow new
models of surveillance (through data-gathering and self-tracking practices) to permeate users’
everyday experience.
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Introduction
Moore’s law suggests that every two years the number of transistors in computer
processors will double, leading eventually to an exponential increase in computer processing
power. This law, formulated as a ‘law’ in 1975, emerged from observations and predictions
made by Gordon Moore—co-founder of Intel—in 1965.1 What had been merely an observational
phenomenon—Moore was describing the present and recent past of the nascent computer
industry—developed into a law that dictated this doubling, reproducing it as an impulse toward
‘innovation.’ It is not that transistors in computer processors would double in density every two
years; instead, it is now imperative that manufactures ensure continued innovation by replicating
this dynamic. Journalists foretelling the ‘death’ of this law,2 then, are often concerned with how
manufacturers will continue to manage and manufacture innovation after transistor density can
no longer be increased. Moore’s ‘law’ becomes less a scientific law useful for description and
empirical analysis and more a capitalist impulse toward continuous innovation and the
reproduction of the drive toward profit. ‘Innovation,’ in turn, comes to orient consumer desire
toward the new.
Materially, we might say that the much-maligned phenomenon of ‘planned obsolescence’
manifests this impulse. Although some suggest that planned obsolescence is necessary and
productive—because it provisions new and improved versions of technologies to consumers and
because consumers request and requires these new versions—planned obsolescence essentially
implants an intrinsic disposability into the devices and tools that we in Western, industrialized
countries use every day. This is problematic because these devices, though they seem to

1
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“Moore’s Law Is the Reason Your iPhone Is so Thin and Cheap.”
Bright, “Moore’s Law Really Is Dead This Time”; “Why the Era of Moore’s Law May Be Coming to an End.”
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disappear into their new versions, end up in mountains of garbage most frequently found in other
countries like China and Ghana.3 Moore’s law and planned obsolescence structure consumer
desire and create a culture of disposability around digital technologies. This thesis examines a
prominent example of this culture of disposability: Apple’s iPhone.
While iPhones are disposable, however, they also demand intense psychological and
affective attachment. In fact, Wikipedia now has a fairly hefty page on ‘nomophobia’ or no
mobile (phone) phobia, which describes a specific kind of anxiety related to being away from
one’s mobile phone; although it is not currently listed as a specific psychological disorder,
psychologists and others have undertaken its study as a legitimate research area. 4 The existence
of nomophobia testifies to the extreme attachment mandated by iPhone, but Russell B. Clayton,
in a 2015 study widely cited in the popular press finding that separation from one’s ringing
iPhone during a cognitive test decreased one’s results on that test, attempts to explain this
attachment rather differently. For him, nomophobia indexes a phenomenological experience of
iPhone as “part of [the] self…in which, under certain conditions, the brain incorporates external
elements into the body schema, treating these as part of the subject’s body.”5 It is not, then, that I
feel an attachment to my iPhone; instead, I am directly attached to iPhone, its misplacement
constituting “a loss or lessening of self.”6 ‘Self,’ here, indexes a kind of embodied experience
that includes the technological device—iPhone—within the bodily schema, modifying the
human’s embodied self-relation. This is to say, most simply, that iPhone is not simply articulated
to the bodily milieu. iPhone, rather, enters it, even as iPhone remains necessarily disposable.

Powell, “Assessing and Improving China’s E-Waste Problem - United Nations University”; Baldé et al., “Global E-Waste
Monitor, 2014.”
4 e.g. Bragazzi and Del Puente, “A Proposal for Including Nomophobia in the New DSM-V”; King et al., “Nomophobia”;
Yildirim and Correia, “Exploring the Dimensions of Nomophobia.”
5 Clayton, Leshner, and Almond, “The Extended iSelf,” 121.
6 Ibid.
3
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Beginning with this tension between attachment and disposability, this thesis analyzes
specific sites, scenes, and situations in which it appears. Overall, I argue that attachment and
disposability always appear together through performance of and with iPhone; that these
performances are structured by a rhetorical impulse that privileges iPhone’s function at the
expense of its form; and that this phenomenal7 dematerialization both displaces—in
experience—iPhone’s material conditions of production, manufacture, and distribution and is
mirrored by the user’s body. In other words, performances of and with iPhone consequentially
contribute both to the culture of disposability concentrated around iPhone and, by imagining the
human body as primarily and immaterially informational, to an intensive and ubiquitous
(self)surveillance, (self)monitoring, and (self)controlling of the human body. Linking both
consequences, I guide my analyses by considering iPhone as a fetish object, and performances of
and with iPhone as a peculiar type of fetishism, one with erotic, magical, and economic valences;
these variegated valences, I show, both constitute the way capital organizes the experience of
iPhone and how iPhone manages to implant the drive to self-monitor into the human.
Rhetorics of Dematerialization
But how can one be attached to an object yet imagine it as disposable? Although this
tension is clearly contradictory I do not attempt to resolve it. Instead, I examine how attachment
and disposability are layered together in an experience of iPhone structured by rhetorics of
dematerialization. These are visual and discursive fragments that, together, construct an impulse
that tends toward the disappearance of the objects to which they refer, which, overall, works to
supplement and promote iPhone’s culture of disposability. In relation to iPhone, this thesis

Phenomenal in the sense of pertaining to phenomena as opposed to material existents, rather than in the sense connoting ‘really
good.’
7
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examines rhetorics of dematerialization through three intersecting vectors: the device, the human
user, and the proximal space that stages their interaction.
In economics and engineering, dematerialization also refers to “the decline over time in
weight of the materials used in industrial end productions.”8 Frequently, dematerialization is
correlated with apparently ‘greener’ industrial practices, because less material used generally
means less impact vis-à-vis processes of material extraction and waste generation.9 However,
perhaps correlated with dematerialization as an industrial trend, design of devices seems to be
undergoing its own sort of dematerialization in the impulse toward ever thinner devices with
fewer physical buttons and ports. These aspects of the device are, as I describe in chapter 1,
virtualized and moved from hardware to the software of iPhone’s graphical user interface.
Importantly, this design imperative—toward thinness, simplicity, and virtualization—only
further places these devices on “the bleeding edge of obsolescence.”10 Dematerialization may
structure a more ‘environmentally friendly’ production process insofar as it uses less material,
but it ultimately leaves unchanged overall structures of production and patterns of circulation
that are, essentially, environmentally unfriendly. As John Bellamy Foster contends:
Ecological modernizers in sociology and sustainable developers in mainstream
economics go beyond this by arguing that technology can work magic: “dematerializing”
economic production so that the capitalist economy can then walk on air (or create a
“weightless society”), thereby continuing its relentless expansion—but with a rapidly
diminishing effect on the environment. Needless to say, such technological fantasies have
no basis in reality.11
Problems pertaining to capitalism’s aggressive and extractive attitude to the environment
remain and, I suggest, are safeguarded in the move toward dematerialization. Although it may be

Herman, Ardekani, and Ausubel, “Dematerialization,” 330.
Hogg and Jackson, “Digital Media and Dematerialization”; Ruth, “Dematerialization in Five US Metals Sectors: Implications
for Energy Use and CO2 Emissions”; Wernick et al., “Materialization and Dematerialization.”
10 Chun, “On Software, or the Persistence of Visual Knowledge,” January 1, 2005, 26.
11 Foster, The Ecological Rift: Capitalism’s War on the Earth, 43.
8
9
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useful to move toward dematerialization in the (very) short term, this does nothing to remedy the
problems caused by the underlying forms and functions of the capitalist system itself in the long
term. The material is always devalued in relation to the functions that it can provide after
processing and manufacture. Combining my notion of rhetorics of dematerialization with this
industrial understanding of dematerialization, we might say that dematerialization is a material
and phenomenal process that ultimately devalues the material in relation to the phenomenal. This
is because the logical end of dematerialization, in all senses, is the elimination of the material as
such: the thinnest device is one that disappears. Rhetorics of dematerialization rely, however, on
a fundamental irony, for even as they construct this impulse toward the object’s disappearance,
they must rely on the continuation of the object’s physical existence. Rhetorics of
dematerialization assert that the object can disappear, while maintaining that it must not do so.
Emphasis on iPhone’s function over its form structures that form’s easy disposability.
This dynamic, in turn, institutes the broader cultural oscillation between extreme attachment to
iPhone (an attachment that depends on exploitative labor practices and destructive environmental
habits) and its disposability (premised on the convenient illusion that the waste we produce
simply disappears). In fact, waste and disposability underpin the reproduction of that
attachment—if we did not throw iPhone away, we could not be directed to attach to its next
version. This is analogous to how Sean Cubitt discusses the foundational importance of waste to
consumer capitalism: “Waste is not an unfortunate by-product of consumerism. Without waste,
including the spectacular waste of flared gas and street lighting, there can be no consumer
capital.”12 Similarly, disposability appears necessary for the attachment that produces and
circulates capital in the form of the commodified iPhone. My analysis goes one step further,

12

Cubitt, “Integral Waste,” 143.
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suggesting that a process exists whereby this necessary—integral—waste is itself experienced as
dematerializing. One could say, of course, that commodification always creates these
dematerializing effects, and to a certain extent this is true; to be attached to that perfect pair of
shoes, for instance, could be to be attached to what feelings about ourselves these shoes might
provide—a certain sense of cool—rather than the shoes themselves, as a material object. And, of
course, when we are finished with these shoes (or when we discover other shoes that appear to
more closely approximate that sense of cool) we might simply throw them away, making them
disappear (from our purview at least). iPhone differentiates itself, however, because it
incorporates its user into its operation as a commodity fetish, forcing the user to mirror the
process of dematerialization in a way that other commodities simply cannot. Rhetorics of
dematerialization circulate between iPhone and user, and in performance the user embodies
them. As I will show in chapter 2, one important way in which iPhone does this is by extracting
information from the user both covertly and overtly and then presenting that information as
visible and, more importantly, manipulable for its user.
Performances of Attachment
With rhetorics of dematerialization as the larger frame, my main analyses focus on
specific instances of the tension between attachment and disposability, considered as
performances of attachment. Generally, these are everyday performances on and with iPhone—
gestural interface, picking it up, throwing it out—that 1) collapse attachment and disposability
into each other under the rhetorical rubric of a phenomenal dematerialization, 2) require users to
enact, embody, and assume the rhetorics of dematerialization, and 3) have both cultural and
individual effects. Scripted by rhetorics of dematerialization, performances of attachment
implement a circuit between attachment and disposability in their enactment. However, this

7

performed attachment is not simply attachment to the material device, considering the effects of
the rhetorics of dematerialization. Essentially, rhetorics of dematerialization create a projection
of the physical device, and that phantom projection is taken for the real thing; performances of
attachment are structured as an embodied intentionality toward this projection over and against
intention toward the real thing,13 promoting investment in the immaterial projection while still
allowing the physical object to be thrown away. As Fredric Jameson writes (about new cars) with
iPhone “we consume, less the thing itself, than its abstract idea, capable of the libidinal
investments ingeniously arrayed for us by advertising.”14 In my view, however, attachment to the
idea of the thing replicates attachment to the physical object, but in a mediated fashion;
attachment to the idea must still manage and produce some kind of attachment to the physical
object, or it would not feel necessary to buy iPhone’s next version. This is an iteration of the
rhetorics of dematerialization’s fundamental irony. If a first-order attachment refers to the
physical existence of iPhone, a second-order attachment activated in performance weaves
connective tissue between the user and a dematerializing version of iPhone—an abstracted, ideal
version comprised of its functions and aesthetic qualities. This collapses material, first-order
attachment and its reciprocal disposability into a more general process of attachment that
produces and reproduces an idea of iPhone as immaterial, or, as constantly undergoing
dematerialization.
The consumption of the idea over the thing is, however, intensified when considering
digital devices generally and iPhone specifically, because performances of attachment with
iPhone create multiple feedback loops or circuits that enact and circulate dematerialization on

13

Intentionality as in the work of Edmund Husserl, who considers intentionality as, at its most general, the recognition that
consciousness is always consciousness of something. See Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology; Husserl,
The Shorter Logical Investigations.
14 Jameson, “Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture,” 133.
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pre-individual, individual, and cultural levels. These circuits are primarily libidinal, as I describe
below, and function to 1) articulate iPhone to its user, 2) connect this scene to the larger cultural
oscillation between attachment and disposability, and 3) connect attachment as performed to the
rhetorics of dematerialization, activating them within the moment and scene of performance.
Finally, performing iPhone intensifies the ideologically mandated consumption of the idea over
the thing because it dematerializes the thing and guides consumer desire in specific ways while
also managing to reorganize the user’s spatial context.
Fetishism
Primarily, performances of attachment guide consumer desire through the operations of a
technological fetishism. This section, and this thesis generally, approach fetishism in the
broadest sense, because though there are three main ways in which fetishism has been theorized,
they are all derived—whether directly or by analogy—from 18th-19th Century European
anthropological accounts of what were then called ‘primitive’ cultures. These three discourses of
fetishism are 1) magico-religious fetishism, 2) commodity fetishism, and 3) sexual fetishism. All
three are focused on value and desire, although each discourse approaches these questions
sometimes radically differently.
The discourse of magico-religious fetishism (though not the practice it described)
emerged in 18th century Europe. As William Pietz writes, the “very word ‘fetishism’ was coined
only in 1757 by Charles de Brosses” and was used to describe what European imperialists saw as
“the most primitive moment of religion.”15 This fetishism might be most clearly outlined as a
kind of animism whereby “material conditions are themselves spiritual values”;16 fetish objects,

15
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Pietz, “Fetishism and Materialism: The Limits of Theory in Marx,” 1993, 131.
Ibid., 141.
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here, are “attributed intentional purpose and desire” or are “personified things.”17 Another way of
putting this is to say that a fetish, in this context, is “a sacred item designed for everyday use.”18
Important, here, is that the purpose and desire attributed to fetishes is just that: attributed. “In
truth,” Pietz writes, fetishes were “merely the externalized material sites fixing people’s own
capricious libidinal imaginings.”19 As externalizations of libidinal ‘imaginings,’ fetishes derive
value (and are ascribed power) from human investments of libidinal or affective energy. They
become meaningful—and, crucially, apparently alive—for their bearers and wearers because
these people have externalized the energy of their desire into them.
Marx writes similarly of the commodity fetish, suggesting that even though “the value of
a commodity represents human labour pure and simple,”20 and, thus, materializes relations
between people, as fetish, the commodity “assumes here…the fantastic form of a relation
between things.”21 This is made possible by a form of capitalism in which producers of goods
produce separately and individually; they do not relate until they enter their product into the
market. Because they only ever have a mediated relationship—because they only relate to each
other through the commodities that they produce—these commodities appear to have simply
emerged as “sensuous things which are at the same time supra-sensible or social.”22 And as
social entities, they are ascribed the ability to enter social relations both with humans and among
themselves. Commodity fetishism appears to construct a mystical world in which commodities
create society with each other, a world that “exists apart from and outside the producers.”23 Like
the magico-religious fetish, the commodity fetish becomes apparently alive because it “accrues

17

Ibid., 139.
Desmet, “Reading the Web as Fetish,” 59.
19 Pietz, “Fetishism and Materialism: The Limits of Theory in Marx,” 1993, 139.
20 Marx, Capital, 135.
21 Ibid., 165.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
18
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an additional value as the correlate of desire,”24 but as a commodity this additional value—and
this aliveness that arrives as the commodity’s ability to relate socially—becomes associated
ontologically with the commodity. Desire that is libidinally invested in the commodity fetish is
ascribed to the commodity, rather than to the human fetishist, making the commodity fetish
appear as if it is itself able to desire, establishing a libidinal circuit, in which desire invested is
circulated through the commodity and back to the fetishist.
iPhone clearly functions as a commodity fetish, especially when we consider that, for
Marx, fetishism “attaches itself to the products of labour as soon as they are produced as
commodities, and is therefore inseparable from the production of commodities;”25 commodities
become fetishes when they are produced as commodities. What’s more, the commodification of
iPhone, and especially our imagining of it as capable of desire, permits the rhetorics of
dematerialization to project an ideal version of the device that invites attachment. This is because
the commodity is essentially a formal structure that promotes the idealization of the object
commoditized and, specifically, because it is imagined as having immaterial and supernatural
properties, which are associated, as I show in chapter 1, with the ‘magic’ of iPhone’s brand.
iPhone as commodity becomes something more than simply material. Whether we call this
supra-material aspect imaginary, supernatural, or ideal, it is emphasized over the physical device,
dematerializing it and allowing us to dispose of it.
iPhone also, in rhetorically constituting its brand community (described below) institutes
libidinal circuitry between it and its users. It demands desire, and promises to return this desire.
In relation to the key phrases of this thesis, iPhone’s fetishistic libidinal circuitry has three main

24
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Schalow, “Fantasies and Fetishes,” 71.
Marx, Capital, 165.
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effects. First, it is constituted by performances of attachment, which are, here, specifically
material. As I describe in chapter 1, iPhone’s interface operates through specific, tactile
gestures—swiping, tapping, and pinching among others. Attachment to the device is primarily
generated through these gestures, which means that desire is invested in iPhone directly and
materially. This actualizes libidinal circuitry when the commodity form intervenes to structure
that process of investiture and, specifically, to insert the idealized and immaterial iPhone
between the physical iPhone and user. Desire directly invested through touch is mediated by the
ideal version of iPhone; desire is then reflected back to the user as if it were iPhone’s.
Secondly, this means that libidinal circuitry represents the most specific actualization of
the rhetorics of dematerialization’s fundamental irony—that the process that pushes iPhone
toward immateriality relies on the continuation of iPhone’s materiality. Touch, and specifically
fetishistic touch, is intensely material, even intimate, but this intimate attachment is diverted
from the physical device (that is actually touched) and toward the ideal projection that mediates
libidinal investiture in iPhone. iPhone’s materiality—its physical existence as well as the
processes of production, manufacture, and distribution that its physical existence manifests—is
deemphasized in this process of diversion.
Finally, libidinal circuitry permits the circulation of the rhetorics of dematerialization’s
effects between user and iPhone. iPhone appears to desire to be with the user, but this appearance
elides that this desire is the user’s reflected. Libidinal circuitry engages the rhetorics of
dematerialization when it deemphasizes the physical iPhone in relation to its projected, ideal
version, but the user (the material source of iPhone’s apparent desire) is similarly deemphasized
when fetishistic libidinal circuitry is actualized. iPhone promises to reciprocate desire as if it
were another person, even though it simply reflects the user’s desire back to her. That this

12

promise of reciprocation is intertwined with iPhone’s rhetorically constituted brand community
suggests that, at least as it functions to create a libidinal circuit between itself and its user, it also
functions to legitimate the user’s identity as user, even if only unstably. In this way, it operates
also as a sexual fetish, in Freud’s sense.
Although Freud writes of sexual fetishism in at least two explicit ways, my focus is on
his later formulation from the essay “Fetishism.” There, Freud suggests that fetishism operates as
a disavowal of the fear of castration, even as it remains an index of that fear’s repression and,
thus, of its continued existence. The male child develops this fear of castration when he sees his
mother’s genitals. He had previously imagined that, like himself, his mother had a penis, but now
understands her to have been castrated; if someone has castrated her, his own castration becomes
a pressing possibility.26 The fetish, typically the object or quality (softness, texture etc.) that the
boy sees directly before this confrontation with castration, becomes “a substitute for the
woman’s (mother’s) phallus which the little boy once believed in and does not wish to forego.”27
Fetishism’s logic of repression—in which “a very energetic action has been exerted to keep up
the denial of” the fear of castration is double.28 It is not quite true that the boy “refus[es] to take
cognizance of the fact perceived by him that a woman has no penis” or that this logic of
repression fully sublimates this fear.29 Instead, “the fetish itself has become the vehicle both of
denying and of asseverating the fact of castration.”30 The fear is denied, perhaps, but the very
objectification of this denial functions as an index of the positive existence of that fear. Said

Freud, “Fetishism,” 205–6.
Ibid., 205.
28 Ibid., 206.
29 Ibid., 205.
30 Ibid., 208.
26
27
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differently, the fetish makes present the fear of castration through a disavowal of that same fear,
by externalizing this fear into an object that can be hidden or made present at will.
This doubling is mirrored by a doubling of fetishism’s legitimatory function. The fetish
functions to legitimate the fetishist as fetishist, but is also functions to legitimate the fetishist as
sexually ‘normal’ (that is, within Freudian psychoanalytic theory, heterosexual). What emerges
here is that the fetish itself (the object) provides an external material support for the protection
and maintenance of the fetishist’s pseudo-normal sexual identity: “it [the fetish] also saves the
fetishist from being a homosexual by endowing women with the attribute which makes them
acceptable as sexual objects…The fetishist has no trouble in getting what other men have to woo
and exert themselves to obtain.”31 The fetishist is able to perform normalcy (heterosexual object
choice)—and to perform it felicitously—only because he has invested the fetish with the ability
to be a sort of unconscious and external prop for the maintenance and reproduction of that
normalcy, even though it functions at the same time as the embodied and external proof of his
inability to assume that normalcy. Fetishism is legitimated as both abnormal and normal,
displaying on an individual level its variegated non-universality. The paradox of the fetish as a
principle for the legitimation of subjectivity allows us to that principle as contradictory and
doubled; the fetish legitimates multiple and contradictory subjectivities. Externalizing the fear of
castration into an object disavows that fear and legitimates sexual normalcy, but the fetishist’s
obsessive introjection of the fetish as object of desire legitimates his being-as-fetishist.
iPhone is not, though, a substitute for the mother’s assumed castrated phallus, nor does it
legitimate specifically hegemonic categories of gender and sexuality. Similarly, my point is not
that iPhone somehow replaces sexual objects. Instead, iPhone’s overall dynamic concerning
31

Ibid., 206.
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attachment and disposability resonates with how the fetishist in Freud’s narrative relates to the
fetish. Freud insists that part of the fetish’s appeal is that it is easy to obtain—reciprocally, it
must be easy to discard. Although psychological, sexual fetishism involves a similar process of
projection as iPhone commodity fetishism. The fetishist becomes attached to an ideal version of
the fetish, while the object itself, due, in part to its ease of attainment, can be discarded and
replaced with new (and presumably better) versions of that ideal projection. Because this
conception of fetishism relates this process directly to the constitution of contradictory fetishistic
subjectivity, however, it allows us to articulate an ideological and objective process to a
complementary psychological and subjective process. This is critically important to this project,
because iPhone requires a user that, as I show in chapter 1, whose performance with iPhone is
both constructed ideologically and necessitates a split subjectivity that contradictorily desires
iPhone only to dispose of it. As I show in chapter 1, however, this is complicated by complex
processes of gestural and performed attachment, that construct iPhone and its user as, in the
moment of use, one larger entity. This would suggest that the libidinal circuitry that obtains
between fetish and fetishist is incorporated into the user as an auto-erotic function of
consciousness, erotic insofar as consumer desire is, here, filtered through iPhone’s virtualization
of tactility and redirected toward the user. This, however, does not exhaust iPhone’s utilization
of the libidinal circuitry implemented by fetishism’s multiple valences. Fetishism’s libidinal
circuitry also represents a sort of binodal economy staged by the emptied space referred to
below, an economy that distorts and distracts from iPhone’s material economy of production.
Method—Rhetoric and Performance
This thesis is rhetorically analytic and performance focused. That is, my method is
oriented largely toward the explication of performance events and sites through the rhetorical
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artifacts that they produce. This dual focus—in choice of artifact and method—is signaled by my
key phrases. These are performances of attachment, that is, that embody rhetorics of
dematerialization. To analyze them appropriately, I draw on the methodological resources both
of rhetorical studies and performance studies. My methods are derived from the qualities of the
objects I am studying. This is to say that, as Rachel Hall writes, “to do justice to my object[s] of
study, I [have] to draw upon a multiplicity of methods.”32
Methodologically, this thesis reserves references to ‘rhetoric’ and ‘rhetorical’ criticism
for the discussion of textual and visual artifacts produced and disseminated by Apple, while
‘performance’ will describe everyday uses of iPhone. If rhetoric appears as a sort of top-down
imposition, this is because my artifacts work on the behalf of the ‘magic’ of the brand to
rhetorically constitute the brand community, a phrase I explore more fully below. We must first
understand, though, that branding is a rhetorical endeavor that suasively creates a desire to
belong—a belief in the magic of the brand—and with this desire constitutes users as a brand
community through performances of attachment. If “the very existence of social subjects (who
would become audience members) is already a rhetorical effect,”33 constituted by their presumed
existence within a rhetorical discourse, iPhone users are just such subjects. Users become a
‘people’ in McGee’s sense, who “are the social and political myths they accept.”34 Their
constitution as a brand community is evidenced (but not embodied) by the rhetorical ephemera it
leaves behind, which is to say, for instance, that iPhone ads that insist on the magical nature of
the device only signal that such a brand community must or will exist and do not embody the
existence of that brand community per se. Although not an ethnography of iPhone users, then,
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my thesis examines key moments in the constitutive rhetoric of iPhone’s branding, examining
how it produces its brand community as a community of actual users and guides this community
both ideologically and affectively. In what follows, I analyze ephemera, including iPhone ad
material; text and images from iPhone’s user manual; iPhone presentations at the yearly Apple
keynote addresses, specifically the 2007 keynote and the introduction of the original iPhone; as
well as viral videos that encapsulate the circulating discourses around iPhone. Taken together,
these artifacts serve as examples and indexes of the constitutive rhetoric that performances of
attachment embody.
I approach the question of embodied performance most explicitly through the question of
gesture and how gesture can signal both “adherence to law and convention on the one hand
and…differentiated corporeal deployments of subjectivity on the other.”35 iPhone, of course,
requires gesture both on and with it. Swiping, tapping, and pinching are all specific sorts of
embodied motion that necessitate a kind of matching with placements of the device. In chapter 1,
I explicate how these required gestural performances adhere to technological and corporeal
conventions, and in chapter 2, I will examine how these same gestures might appear to function
as intensely personal, expressive individual performances that are “communicating our desire to
communicate.”36 In both cases, however, my attention is primarily focused on attachment and
how it affects and might reorganize embodied experience. The analyses provided in both
chapters explore how performances of attachments are scripted by rhetorics of dematerialization,
enact dematerialization in performance, and, thus, reproduce dematerialization along three
vectors: the device, the self, and space.
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Device—Thing
So, why ‘iPhone?’ With the influx of new touchscreen smartphones and Apple’s
decreasing market share worldwide, would it not be more accurate to use a more general term? I
retain ‘iPhone’ for two interrelated reasons. First, as of the time of this writing, iPhone still
commands 43.5% of the United States smartphone market, which both indicates its saturation of
the market and the obsession it continues to invite.37 Of course, this market saturation points to a
more salient factor: iPhone’s brand—and Apple’s brand more generally—is one that inculcates
intense loyalty and almost cult-like devotion in its brand community. But, as I suggest above, a
culture of disposability is organized around iPhone that, through performances of attachment,
orients consumer desire toward a phantom projection of the device and away from the device
itself, considered as a material object. This is another iteration of the primary dynamic that this
thesis investigates—the contradiction between the disposable device and the indispensable thing.
This dynamic maps onto the way that Albert Borgmann discusses ‘the device paradigm”
in Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life. In the contemporary world, the human
relation to technology has been reorganized. Technology always “promises to bring the forces of
nature and culture under control, to liberate us from misery and toil, and to enrich our lives,”38
and to “do so without imposing burdens on us;”39 typically, we consider technology as a forward
march of constant progression toward ‘better’ versions of old technologies. These better versions
make their functions more easily available to us—iPhone makes communication faster and easier
than the telegraph—while also imposing a smaller burden on its users—iPhone’s GUI is more
accessible than the user interface of DOS computers. Borgmann suggests that this replaces things

Reisinger, “Apple’s iPhone Share Is Static But iPad Is Tumbling.”
Borgmann, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life, 41.
39 Ibid., 41.
37
38

18

with devices. A thing “is inseparable from its context,”40 explicitly exhibits the interior workings
of its functions, and constructs a small social world around itself.41 He writes, “the experience of
a thing is always and also a bodily and social engagement with the thing’s world…It was a
focus.”42 To exemplify the thing, he discusses a fireplace. Its main function was to provide
warmth to the family, but it also collected “the work and leisure of the family,”43 structuring their
lives in specific ways; in doing so, it also provided functions that exceeded the provision of
warmth:
It assigned to the different family members tasks that defined their place in the
household. The mother built the fire, the children kept the firebox filled, and the father
cut the firewood. It provided for the entire family a regular and bodily engagement with
the rhythm of the seasons that was woven together the threat of cold and the solace of
warmth, the smell of wood smoke, the exertion of sawing and of carrying, the teaching of
skills, and the fidelity to daily tasks.44
The fireplace certainly provides warmth, but in doing so it also affords to the family an
entire way of life, complete with specific roles that include individuals’ bodily actions inside the
world created by the fireplace. These roles are experienced as physically burdensome; it is
difficult to chop wood, it is strenuous to carry it, and it takes skill and effort to start the fire.
Additionally, the fireplace’s functioning is on view, easily understandable from the outside; its
machinery and its function are intertwined, both available to the human user.
Devices, on the other hand, divorce machinery from function, delivering the function
provided by a thing but with “the machinery concealed [.] The [functions…] are enjoyed without
the encumbrance of or the engagement with a context.”45 If a fireplace provides warmth while

40

Ibid., 41.
Ibid., 41–43.
42 Ibid., 41.
43 Ibid., 41–42.
44 Ibid., 42.
45 Ibid., 47.
41

19

displaying its machinery and creating social roles that require performing burdensome tasks, an
electric heater provides warmth while requiring only minimal effort from the user and without
displaying how it is able to create heat. Borgmann discusses this by counterposing means and
ends: a thing intertwines means (machinery) and functions (ends), while a device dissolves this
connection, through “the concealment and unfamiliarity of the means and the simultaneous
prominence and availability of the ends.”46 Interestingly, these ends, which in relation to things
are referred to as functions, are referred to in relation to devices as “commodities.” Although
Borgmann uses the term loosely, to index merely “those aspects or properties of a device that
provide the answer to “What is the device for?””47 these commodities—which are
dematerialized—often converge, with iPhone, with what is fetishistically commodified. In any
case, these ‘commodities’—these ends or functions—supersede and efface the manner in which
they operate. They conceal the workings of the device, dematerializing the technological
operations of the device in favor of providing seamless services and burdenless functionality. We
interface with these commodities or ends without having to understand the practical nature of the
technologies that deliver them. Because of this, they do not offer users specific social roles to fill
nor do they order miniature social worlds revolving around themselves.
iPhone is clearly a device. We interact with icons rather than with transistors, and these
icons deliver specific seamless services usable without any substantial burden—it just works, or
it is supposed to, to reference an old Apple slogan. At the same time, however, iPhone also has
characteristics of a thing; in fact, we might say that iPhone is a device that wants to be a thing, a
wanting that underscores its fetishistic operations. The update underlines the distinction between
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iPhone as device and iPhone as thing. Considered as a disposable material object, iPhone is a
device, delivering functions that operate seamlessly and without placing any burden on the user;
because its functions are primary, the material object can be discarded in the update. It can be
thrown away when a new iPhone is released. These functions themselves, however, operate
similarly to a thing, because, through them, iPhone organizes a specific social world around
itself, complete with the provision of social roles, even if all those roles are fundamentally
version of the ‘user.’ What’s more, these functions themselves do not “just work.” Like most
modern technologies, iPhone must be updated consistently in order to eliminate the elements that
make it not work. This applies to updates to apps and iPhone’s operating system, but also to
‘updates’ to the physical device itself. These updates index presumed difficulties with using
iPhone—bugs with software, or problems with antenna. At the same time, implementing updates
are experienced as such a difficulty or ‘burden’ in Borgmann’s words. The process of updating
takes time and disrupts seamless use of iPhone. Although to be an iPhone user is to embody
rhetorics of dematerialization, updates underline dematerialization’s fundamental irony—to
perform dematerialization is to produce and reproduce iPhone as a physical object, even if
updating considers each successive version of iPhone a closer approximation of an ideal,
immaterial version of iPhone. Effort engages affective attachment with iPhone as device (a
collection of seamless functions), but the ironic interruption of that seamlessness is the
foundation of that effort.
Self—User
We might ask, though, who precisely makes that effort? I argue that iPhone’s brand
functions as a constitutive rhetoric that presumes the existence of a ‘brand community,
comprised of individuals performing attachment together. Marketing scholars Muñiz, Jr. and
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O’Guinn define a brand community as “a specialized, non-geographically bounded community,
based on a structured set of social relationships among admirers of a brand. It is specialized
because at its center is a branded good or service…brand communities are participants in the
brand’s larger social construction.”48 These communities are not simply groups of people that
admire a brand or use a product, however. For marketing scholars Kilambi, Laroche & Richard,49
advertising functions as a sort of constitutive rhetoric,50 which supposes that iPhone’s brand and
advertising organizes potential users as a brand community before they are actually iPhone users.
A major way Apple does this with iPhone, specifically, is by creating “branded devices designed
to simply make consumers believe they are magical,”51 making them fetishes by design. This sort
of fetish effect is modulated by Apple products, like iPhone, into a religious or cult-like
experience for the brand community.52 Branding iPhone as magical highlights the deeply felt
modifications in subjective experience brought about because of participation in (or
interpellation into) a brand community. One way to frame my thesis, then, is by imagining it as a
critical intervention into the branding of iPhone and user experiences with the seemingly magical
device.
Focus on the brand community surrounding iPhone also limits the scope of this project.
Analyzing the differences in advertising and interface among different touchscreen smartphone
manufacturers is beyond the scope of the thesis, for example. I consider iPhone representative of
the wider smartphone market because of its continued dominance of the market and because its
original form and function continue to guide the direction of phones made by other
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manufactures. Given its market share and influence, iPhone’s rhetorical footprint informs the
rhetorical footprint of touchscreen smartphones made by other manufacturers. In any case, no
other touchscreen smartphone has developed a brand community so saturated by magical,
fetishistic ideas concerning the object around which it is centered. It is important, then, to retain
‘iPhone’ because these magical valences—in the form of fetishism—lie precisely at the center of
my analysis. And as one final note, I will use ‘iPhone’ instead of ‘the iPhone’ throughout this
thesis because Apple literature on iPhone and Apple representatives refer to iPhone without the
definite article. Additionally, dropping the definite article continuously draws toward the word
some of the fetishistic magic that is perceived to exude from the object itself. If iPhone is a
fetish, this makes it appear to desire, meaning that iPhone as proper noun is especially
appropriate. It is as if the device were another person, user, or performer. The phrase
“performing iPhone” alludes to the murky middle between these joint performers: user and
device. Because the phrase functions variably as verb and noun—I am performing iPhone, but
the device is performing well or not so well—it indexes the circulation of rhetorics of
dematerialization between the two performers as well as their ephemeral attachment in the
moment of use.
This joint performance means that the user is, first, also dematerializing. Sensors, direct
input, and surveillance practices that depend on these features create an image of the user as pure
data and, as I describe in chapter 2, visualize this data in ways that allow the user to export parts
of the experience of embodiment to the device. Secondly, iPhone is a specifically mobile device.
We are meant to use it while moving, operating as modern go-getters, walking and talking about
our overfull schedules. This implied user—this fantasy body of limitless mobility—clearly
excludes certain kinds of bodies, specifically concerning notion of class mobility and bodily
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ability, because it presumes, again ironically, certain characteristics of the user’s dematerialized
body. It is precisely this presumption regarding characteristics of the user’s body that constitutes
iPhone’s brand community.
Space—Scene
If interactions with iPhone can be considered performances, however, where do these
performances occur? As a first suggestion, we might return to iPhone’s mobility. Because it can
be used anywhere, any space can be reorganized as its scene. As Peter Brooks contends:
I can take any empty space and call it a bare stage. A [person] walks across this empty
space whilst someone else is watching [them], and this is all that is needed for an act of
theatre to be engaged.53
He is, of course, examining theater in a conventional sense, so the scene for performance
is, here, specifically formulated as a ‘stage.’ Although performing iPhone does not require a
stage because it is essentially a kind of performance that is not strictly theater, a more general
form of this idea still applies. iPhone is mobile; I can use it anywhere. This means that I can take
any empty space, perform iPhone there, and transform it into the scene for iPhone’s
performance. This is all that is needed.
In fact, iPhone asserts that it is the only necessary condition for its own performance,
although it is demonstrably not. Nevertheless, iPhone’s audacious assertion of autonomy from
more general conditions for performance generates the scene for its performance. In chapter 2, I
will call this autonomous and automatically generated scene ‘the emptied space’ by analyzing
Apple’s advertising material for iPhone. This emptied space is the scene for iPhone’s
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performance, but it is markedly different from other senses of scene, including Brook’s. As
Diana Taylor writes:
scene denotes intentionality, artistic or otherwise (the scene of the crime), and signals
conscious strategies of display. The word appropriately suggests both the material stage
as well as the highly codified environment that gives viewers pertinent information, say,
class status or historical period.54
We are not given, however, a material stage or an environment on or in which to perform
iPhone. Instead, when we turn on iPhone—when we touch, tap, pinch, and swipe over and on its
lit surface—iPhone immerses us in a designed environment that reformats and modulates the
physical spaces we inhabit within the moment of performance. Enacting iPhone via
performances of attachment, then, performatively reorganizes proximal space into the very scene
that allows for “the possibilities of the action [that] defines place.”55 Defining performances of
attachment in this way is, of course, circular, but this circularity highlights how iPhone’s autogenerated scene—the emptied space—is different from how Taylor describes scene: “no place is
free of history and social practice.”56 The scene always furnishes relevant historical information
by being embedded in and continuous with an historical repertoire of performance traditions that
articulates the scene with historical time and non-performance space. By claiming to generate the
scene for its own performance, however, iPhone attempts to disconnect its scene from historical
time and non-performance space.
iPhone only ever appears within the emptied space, and only ever as an enactment of
attachment. This is not to say, of course, that iPhone does not ‘exist’ as a material object. Instead,
my supposition is that iPhone can only ever be experienced in its performance and that, further,
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if one desires access to iPhone, one is required to perform attachment. This formulates the
emptied space as a virtual space in which iPhone seems to magically appear, a space that through
the requirement to perform attachment extends, in the moment of use, beyond iPhone,
reformatting the space around the user as similarly empty. This emptiness has no temporal or
spatial history, and so manages to displace and defer recognition of iPhone’s material conditions
of production, manufacture, and distribution, or, in other words, to dematerialize the space
around the user as well as, I will argue in chapters 1 and 2, the user’s body itself. From the
outside, these subjective dematerializing effects look like an obsessive absorption—teenagers
with eyes on phone inattentively crossing busy streets, young women at baseball games taking
selfies instead of watching the game,57 or even texting while driving—but this absorption, I
suggest, is not the sort of generational narcissism that it is often portrayed as. Instead, performing
attachment with iPhone is a respatializing activity that allows the user to toggle between ‘full’
space and the emptied space. However, and to again insist on an irony, this toggling underlines
how the space being emptied rather than empty connotes a subdued yet continuous connection to
historical time and non-performance space. If a thing is emptied, it was once full, that is, and if it
was once full, it can become full again. In chapter 2, I discuss in more detail how this filling
might occur. Here, though, I merely wish to insist that in the moment of performance, the user
brings with her details from her own life and leaves them in the emptied space. This implies the
creation of new worlds inside the emptied space, as well as—because performing iPhone, again,
represents the space between user and iPhone—a reciprocal reorganization of embodied
experience.
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Overall, associating these three vectors with fetishism is meant to offer some dim
optimism concerning the introjection, through technological fetishism, of contemporary forms of
(self) control as performances of attachment. Because fetishism is non-universal and necessarily
variegated—because it legitimates contradictory normal/abnormal subjectivities—it destabilizes,
as Marx and Pietz suggest, the very thing it is meant to legitimate in addition to its own power of
legitimation. As Homi Bhabha writes, “the fetish mimes the forms of authority at the point at
which it deauthorizes them,”58 suggesting that even as the fetish legitimates subjectivities—even
as self-control is interiorized through fetishism—its power to legitimate is called into question,
insofar as it overextends itself in attempting to legitimate contradictory subjectivities. This is not
to say that we can write our way out of ubiquitous surveillance, ecological disaster, or capital’s
exploitation. Instead, it is to say that rather than trapping users in a closed ideological field,
technological fetishism underlines ideology’s implicit instability.
The Chapters
Chapter 1 examines performances of attachment as a kind of ‘practical magic,’ and is
primarily concerned with device and user. Examining images and text from iPhone 6/6s user
manual as well as ad material for iPhone’s “3d Touch” feature, I examine the ways in which
attachment is performed as dematerialization through iPhone’s gestural interface and how this
links the practice of iPhone—performing iPhone—and the magic of its brand. This interface
works to 1) articulate my body to the device, 2) to visualize, virtualize, and thus dematerialize
tactility itself through the construction and deployment of a slick touch and a virtual deep touch
and 3) to dematerialize both, replacing them with an autoerotic ‘circuit’ in which my own
fetishistic desire is returned to myself in the moment of touch. This dynamic and the specific
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practices it scripts are formulated as attachment to iPhone’s brand, which magically
dematerializes them and reciprocally conjures a user constantly articulated to the brand as a selfcomposed individual.
Chapter 2 shifts focus, and provides a critical and theoretical exegesis of the emptied
space. Using de Certeau’s distinctions between space and place and strategies and tactics,59 I
consider the emptied space as delivering a set of strategized tactics. Although it appears to
promote the creative appropriation of the scene it generates, it actually contains users through the
provision of specific modes of spatial appropriation and self-composure; what appears creative
and voluntary is actually controlling and containing. I, first, examine how the emptied space is
imagined in iPhone advertising as the scene for the delivery of fresh updates and new features
and as reorganizational of proximal space. Second, I complicate this picture by examining two
prominent actualizations of the emptied space: selfies and narcissism and distracted driving.
Here, the constitution of emptied space through emic performance is compromised post facto by
an etic observation that attempts to incorporate emptied space into already circulating cultural
discourses. The acts of observation and interpretation apply meanings to the emptied space that
contrast with the performance based meanings generated by iPhone users. Finally, I describe
how observation compromises performance even before the constitution of the emptied space.
Examining the fitness app “MyFitnessPal,” and building on literature concerning self-tracking
devices and surveillance technologies, I will show that MyFitnessPal (and other like apps) utilize
and display the information that iPhone collects, and in this display, makes the body appear to be
transparent and, by offering the body’s inside to touch as perfectly manipulable. Observation—
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construed as dataveillance—compromises the performative constitution of emptied space both
after its constitution and before and during its constitution.
Finally, I conclude with a reflection on the trajectory of this thesis and the trajectory of
iPhone generally. I summarize my major findings, point to some of the larger gaps in my
research, and attempt to provide some avenues for further research. Additionally, I connect the
rhetorics of dematerialization to larger logics of neoliberalism, especially its impulse toward
individual atomization, in an attempt to find some possibilities for resisting the control that the
rhetorics of dematerialization structures.
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Practically Magic: Gesture, Dematerialization, and iPhone Fetishism
In 2007, during the keynote address introducing the original iPhone, Steve Jobs describes
its capacitive multi-touch interface as “phenomenal. It works like magic.”60 The technological
ability to touch the screen—to, as Jobs later emphasizes, touch your music, movies, and other
personal material—is such an advancement over previous technologies that it appears to function
supernaturally. This magical aura influenced iPhone’s branding, advertising, and reception, and
even continues to impact ads for iPhone’s most recent iteration. For instance, “Midnight,” an ad
for iPhone 7’s low-light camera, depicts a teenage boy skateboarding at night, pausing to take
pictures. Over softly arpeggiated guitar and hushed vocals, we see him photographing sparkling
sprinklers, less than timid deer, and a romantically inflated full moon. At the end, as he stands on
a cliff overlooking ‘the nameless town’ mentioned in the ad’s song, “practically magic” appears,
overlaying the image.61 The low-light camera’s capabilities are so advanced that they appear
magical, and though this magic is tempered by the quaintly humble ‘practically,’ the ad does
highlight one important function of iPhone’s magic—its ability to create “transcendental or
magico-religious experiences” for its brand community.62 The boy in “Midnight” is delivered
such an experience and it is only made possible by iPhone 7 and its camera. The world pauses
for him and his camera—nervous animals pose for pictures, the moon is overfull, and,
unrealistically, all cars are parked, meaning that he can skateboard freely on city streets. When
we see his face, his eyes are always wide, as if the world is somehow astounding. The experience
constructed here is, while perhaps not religious or transcendent, magical in a more mundane
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sense: unforgettable, beautiful, somehow outside of everyday life. It is a practical magic that is
accessible, usable, and that magnifies the quotidian from the inside.
Through analyses of Apple’s 2007 keynote event, images and text from the user manual
for iOS 8.4 software, as well as iPhone ad material, this chapter parses this practical magic,
offering it as a primary nexus for the delivery and actualization of rhetorics of dematerialization,
defined in the introduction as visual and discursive manifestations of a phenomenal and
ideological process that emphasizes iPhone’s functions and aesthetic qualities over its material
form. “Practical” suggests the everyday, the useful, and the usable, alluding etymologically to
practice. Rhetorics of dematerialization instruct the practice of using iPhone by providing scripts
for its optimal usage that discard the discrete materiality of bodies and objects in favor of their
ephemeral, gestural joining. I refer to “magic,” on the other hand, to describe aspects of iPhone
that seem to place its experience outside of the everyday. It is both an object that seems to speak,
act, desire, and demand and also one that appears to disappear, as if its material form is only a
fleeting instantiation of some ideal, immaterial iPhone comprised of functions, aesthetic
qualities, and especially branding. The rhetorics of dematerialization evidence a phenomenal
dematerialization utilized for ideological purposes. Overall, this chapter describes
dematerialization as a fetishistic magic that depends on practices that generate both physical and
psychological attachment. This operates, under consumer capitalism, as an ideological effect that
produces both an immaterial, ideal version of iPhone that stands in for the material device, while
also induces users to orient to iPhone as if it were an intimate friend.
This chapter begins with practice, with usage of iPhone at and within specific moments.
I, first, describe how these moments accumulate as a gestural coupling of body and iPhone
framed as disciplinary. iPhone’s interface requires gestures that performatively articulate the
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human user with iPhone, imagining both in pieces that are put together in and as the application
of a kind of social discipline that interpellates individuals as users. Second, these interpellative
practices and the users that are produced through them invite touch, yet virtualize it when it
arrives. This virtualization has two reciprocal moments: a slick touch in which human touch slips
from iPhone’s surface; and a deep touch in which iPhone’s screen itself evaporates and is
replaced by icons and images. Thirdly, with this invitation and evaporation, I turn more
specifically to iPhone’s magic. Functioning doubly as a fetish, iPhone appears to demand desire
and to desire in return—to invite and even require touch—even if, as I contend, both the demand
and the reciprocation are only apparent. Finally, I contend that iPhone’s fetishistic magic
structures the gestural practice that iPhone invites through an analysis of an ad for iPhone 7’s
camera, called “The Human Family.” This ad depicts a series of user selfies, but it embeds the
gestures that make up selfie taking within an empty white space that stands in for the brand and
its magic.
Gestural Articulation
iPhone requires gestures. “A few simple gestures—tap, drag, swipe, and pinch—are all
you need to use iPhone,”63 we are told; to use iPhone at all we gesture on iPhone and in gesturing
on iPhone, we gesture with iPhone. Gesture demands that the hand make certain motions
(gesture-on) while at the same time requiring a certain placement of iPhone (gesture-with).
Gesture-with performs a matching between iPhone and the hand that holds it. Our hand must be
somewhere and shaped in a specific way to hold iPhone, while iPhone must be placed
specifically to be held. Matched placement mirrors matched performances that structure gestureon. iPhone must function if I am to use it. By this I mean that iPhone must perform in certain
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physical and technological ways that make it available for my subsequent performance with it,
and my gesture on it. This ‘matching’ mirrors Foucault’s description, in Discipline and Punish,
of power’s “instrumental coding of the body” in the context of schools and military institutions.
Writing specifically of military training maneuvers performed under the watch of military elites,
he writes that power’s relation to gesture:
consists of a breakdown of the total gesture into two parallel series: that of the parts of
the body to be used (right hand, left hand, different fingers of the hand, knee, eye, elbow,
etc.) and that of the parts of the object manipulated (barrel, notch, hammer, screw, etc.);
then the two sets of parts are correlated together according to a number of simple gestures
(rest, bend); lastly, it fixes the canonical succession in which each of these correlations
occupies a particular place.64
The total gesture explicitly includes body and object, and this inclusion articulates them
together. A gesture is a body/object system understood only in and as their unification. This
unification is only achieved, though, insofar as both body and object are conceived of as a series
of parts. The disciplinary imaginary produces the body as a dismembered effect which it can then
re-member as constantly articulated with objects: “Discipline defines each of the relations that
the body must have with the object that it manipulates. Between them it outlines a meticulous
meshing.”65 Disciplinary power dismembers human bodies and objects, matches each body part
with an object part, and then meshes these parts together through specific gestures. The
subjectivating effects of disciplinary power are actuated in its application, for it induces the rememberment of body parts and object parts as gesturally unified components of a new
disciplinary subject. Gesture, when utilized as a primary micro-process for disciplinary
subjectivation, subsumes body and object, manufacturing a joint subject that is something other
than purely material, considering that the linkage between body and object is only ever confined
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to specific moments—that it is, in other words, momentary, ephemeral, and imaginary, rather
than essential and physical.
Although both military training maneuvers and the use of iPhone consist of gestural
performances for audiences, there are important distinctions between these contexts. Gestures
like military maneuvers occur within a specific institutional setting controlled and structured by
the watchful eyes of certain elites (e.g. officers, teachers) who also constitute the audience for the
performance of these gestures. Soldiers, in Foucault’s example, perform in view for review,
becoming “a body manipulated by [an] authority” that only emerges as specific authoritative
individuals. The imperative to properly perform, in this context, is induced by the supervisor’s
gaze, and the inability to properly perform reveals a lack of discipline that demands correction.
Usage of iPhone, however, does not occur within an institutional context and does not operate
under the demands of institutional pressure. Rather than a lack of discipline, poor or novice users
risk exposing themselves as outdated—alongside the enticements of brand, social pressure,
rather than institutional pressure, constitutes an implied audience of watchful others who regard
each other as only suspiciously tech-savvy. If a top-down, vertical surveillance structures the
application of gestural discipline in institutions like the military barracks, a horizontal
surveillance operating between and among users structures the gestural performances required to
use iPhone. Mark Andrejevic labels this ‘lateral surveillance,’66 which is:
the redoubling of the panoptic model whereby the subjects of the panoptic gaze come to
take on some of the responsibilities not just of monitoring themselves, but of keeping
66
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track of one another…Internalizing the gaze—in an era of governance in terms of risk—
comes to mean not just turning it upon oneself (in the anticipation of the possibility of
being watched), but also directing it outwards toward others (as if to fill in the gaps of the
big Other’s gaze, to realize this gaze in a skeptical era), in the name of responsibility
towards oneself.67
Responsibility toward myself in the context of lateral surveillance requires keeping track
of others, and though the lateral surveillance involved in the general usage of iPhone is not as
literal as Andrejevic’s first example (a “neighborhood watch program against terrorism”),68 it
could be that the general conditions for iPhone usage provide the grounds for more specified
applications of lateral surveillance, especially considering iPhone and touchscreen smartphone’s
perceived ubiquity. It could be that this perceived ubiquity also diffuses lateral surveillance into
social domains not previously under surveillance. This is because iPhone, in part through “social
network sites[,] enable[s] users to engage in practices of self-monitoring and self-actualization,
while also providing a means of keeping tabs on one another.”69 Self-tracking and selfmanagement through the internalization of a disciplinary gaze comprised of multiple others
rather than one ‘big Other’ is generalizable beyond literal applications like neighborhood
terrorist watch programs, and can come to involve, potentially, any function filtered through
iPhone.70 The inducement to perform is stimulated by the ability of these functions to imply an
audience that is suspicious of your ability to adequately use that specific function of iPhone and
your ability to adequately use iPhone itself.
Although developed in the context of the adoption of biometric technologies and the
securitization of identity in an internet capable, data-driven world, Kelly Gates’ conception of
the ‘tech-savvy citizen’ helps to describe this inducement to perform. Generally, tech-savvy
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citizens are “people for whom technical competency and active participation in their own selfgovernment are two mutually constitutive responsibilities.”71 To be tech-savvy is to be
responsible for the management and securitization of one’s own identity and, in conjunction with
the lateral surveillance made possible by iPhone, to be responsible for the maintenance of the
management and securitization of other’s identities. Both responsibilities require the tech-savvy
citizen to adopt and experiment with new and updated technologies. “Experimenting with new
technologies doubles as a form of experimenting with the self…reinventing ourselves as capable,
competent, productive citizen-subjects,”72 and this experimentation is mandated by perceived or
implied social “pressure to adopt new devices and acquire new skills.”73
Lateral surveillance vis-à-vis iPhone operates as a diffused social discipline that enforces
tech-savviness as a civic responsibility. Under the watchful eyes of unnamed others, we are
invited to perform gesture—to touch iPhone—though this invitation also is structured as a way to
evade suspicion that I am, perhaps, not as tech-savvy, and therefore not as civically or personally
competent, as I may seem or as others are. Performing iPhone in gesture does not take place for
an institutional audience or in an institution, but it does, then, intervene on the individual as a
kind of disciplinary subjectivation. Gesture, and its dismemberment of bodies and objects, still
functions as a technique of power, one that is applied as the re-memberment of those parts as a
new sort of subject, here, the tech-savvy iPhone user. Crucially, however, this re-memberment
that unifies also deemphasizes the physical separateness of the body and object that have been
dismembered.
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Figure 1, from iPhone’s user manual, visualizes this process. iPhone and body are first
visually dismembered, considered as parts. We see a visual representation of iPhone’s screen,
disembedded from the rest of iPhone, and we see a disembodied and dismembered hand floating
toward and over it. The screen demands a specific contortion of the hand: the index finger points,
the thumb rests against the index finger, while the rest of the fingers curl toward the palm. In
return, the hand demands that the screen remain placed steadily,
for if the screen were to move too far away, gesture on it would
be impossible. The overall gesture depicted demands a specific
gesture with iPhone that places it in range of the hand and the
gesture on iPhone. In Figure 1, this gesture on is visualized both
Figure 1

by a doubling of the hand, with one of the doubles outlined in

gray and one outlined in black, as well as a thick blue arrow pointing from left to right. Swiping
across the surface of iPhone, then, is itself depicted as a series of smaller gestures, each also
comprised of moving body parts. That is, the gray outlined hand represents the beginning of the
larger gesture while the black outlined hand represents the end of the larger gesture; in between
are an implied but unrepresented series of smaller gestures that are connected through the blue
arrow. This implied intermediary series are visually folded into the motion of the larger gesture.
If this larger gesture contains these smaller gestures it also must include the hand and
iPhone in each of these positions. The swiping image is an image of the hand being subsumed
under the gesture, articulated to the screen in both positions represented as well as in the
positions implied by the blue arrow. The blue arrow represents the gesture itself—the movement
of the hand—but in so doing includes the hand at every position in the space between the hand’s
starting position and its final position. Gesture—the blue arrow—visually subsumes what would
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otherwise be repetitious representation of the gesturing hand; gesture per se supersedes the
gesturing body in the moment of gesture.
In two ways, the screen is represented similarly as an abstracted version of iPhone in
every position corresponding to a position of the hand. First, the positions of the screen are
subsumed in the representation because the reason we do not see the screen in any other position
is because presumably the screen would not move. Remaining unmoved is represented, here, by a
figure that is stable but that nonetheless theoretically includes all positions of the screen that
correspond to a position of the hand. Secondly, the gesture, here, subsumes iPhone’s material
form—its casing, hardware, cameras etc.—by the gesture. The image is of the gesture rather than
of iPhone or the hand or both, disallowing representation of iPhone’s material form. Although
the gesture relies on this material substrate, it negates it at the same time.
iPhone’s multi-touch interface is imaged, then, as a first layer of dematerialization.
Optimally—for the user manual depicts optimal (conditions for) use—iPhone requires gestural
performances that foreground the ephemeral join created by the gesture and, in the process,
deemphasize the physical separateness that surrounds and structures these moments of
articulation. To deemphasize physical separateness in relation to ephemeral, gestural articulation
is also to deemphasize the physical as such. As the user manual shows, the materiality of both
the body and iPhone is superseded by gestures that include them. Crucially, however,
representation of the material forms of the body and iPhone never fully disappears. Some
minimalist materiality must remain for gesture to occur, though it is channeled into the
representation of only those parts of either entity that are necessary for the moment of gesture.
Dematerialization actuated as disciplinary gesture imagines bodies in pieces, applying
itself as the reorganization of these pieces into more extensive gestural wholes or, said
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differently, a sort of gestural subject that includes both the human user and iPhone itself. In other
words, iPhone’s user manual operates as a rhetoric that scripts performances of gesture on and
with iPhone as a series of articulations that is 1) molded and modeled by a social pressure to be
tech-savvy and that 2) manufactures a dematerialized subject of gesture by emphasizing the
imaginary gesture over the material forms of the gesturer and that which is gestured on.
Slick Touch, Deep Touch
These rhetorics do not simply script the performance of iPhone, however. Through that
performance, the performers (user and iPhone) are also made to embody them, meaning that
dematerialization also works on a phenomenal level. This section examines how
dematerialization is actualized phenomenally, suggesting that the gestures that articulate user and
iPhone as a new sort of subject are also virtualized in the moment that they appear, exhibiting a
dematerialization of the very activity that makes interface with iPhone possible—the operations
of tactility itself.
This virtualization has two moments: 1) a slick touch that dematerializes the user’s
gesture: iPhone’s screen itself requires and constructs touch, but denies tactility, or my touch
slips from its surface in the moment of touch and 2) a deep touch that dematerializes the surface
gestured on: even as I touch the screen, I touch something deeper than the screen, or the touch of
the surface is effaced by the technological construction of depth in the moment of touch. Slick
and deep touch work together to flatten iPhone’s tactile experience and ultimately to invite
investment, that is lower described as libidinal, in iPhone’s brand and other-than-material
functions, rather than investment in iPhone as a material thing: if slick touch and deep touch
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function as “extensions of the senses,”74 touch specifically, this is only because they virtualize
that sense.
Slick touch is best exemplified by iPhone’s keyboard. In the 2007 keynote, Jobs
describes the plastic keyboards of previous smartphones as a troublesome problem of terrible
design. “The problem,” he said, pointing to an image of older smartphones, “is that lower 40,”75
referring to the lower portion of the phone occupied by a physical keyboard. This is because the
physical keyboard cannot change depending on the specific requirements of the application
currently in use. iPhone solves this problem by ridding itself of the physical keyboard and taking
the form of one large screen with an adaptable virtual keyboard, exemplifying
dematerialization’s design mandate: replace the physical with the virtual, because the physical
just gets in the way. Less material—fewer buttons and switches, thinner design—allows the
device to more ably deliver its functions and more closely adhere to an ideal form delivered as
pure design.
However, this keyboard was not always appreciated by users. Anna Haywood and
Gemma Boguslawski, describing usability issues plaguing iPhone early in its life cycle, relate
that though the “‘no-button’ design of touchscreen phones [provides for] a more sleek aesthetic
design not ‘burdened’ by the need to accommodate physical buttons,”76 “there was not
widespread confidence that the performance [of iPhone’s virtual keyboard] could ever match that
exhibited on a physical keypad.”77 Haywood and Boguslawski, here, become mouthpieces for the
rhetoric of dematerialization. Buttons are ‘burdens’ that must be removed in service of the
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creation of a ‘sleek aesthetic design.’ ‘Design,’ as a less than material category denoting certain
aesthetic qualities of the device, takes precedence over the material device—buttons are burdens
even when users prefer them, meaning that users’ actual desires evaporate in the face of
dematerialization’s design imperatives. We should invest in these sleek buttonless devices, rather
than our clunky, old devices with them. What’s more, we should invest in only the idea of sleek
buttonless design rather than the device that design produces. Critically, per the users surveyed
by Haywood and Boguslawski, the virtual keyboard’s “loss of tactility was cited as a factor
contributing” to this preference for buttons.78 ‘Loss’ of tactility is packaged with loss of buttons,
even though iPhone’s interface contains ‘touch’ in its name. Even as iPhone’s interface is
explicitly and necessarily touch-based, users perceived at its introduction a loss of a specific kind
of tactile experience i.e. the feel of the physical keyboard. This is slick touch: even as touch
becomes more vital to the overall experience of using the phone, it is abstracted, and as
abstracted, it slides off iPhone’s hard, flat surface. The surface is theoretically and physically
slippery. Intriguingly, however, in the user manual, instructions about how to use the keyboard
are some of the rare instructions associated with images that
depict iPhone’s physical form (figure 2). Although this might
seem at first to resist my reading, as this implies a specific
materiality of touch, it in fact underlines slick touch’s
constitutive tension (as well as that of dematerialization
generally). For iPhone demands this physical touch. If

Figure 2: From iPhone’s user manual

physical touch is to be abstracted, it must first be present; if
touch is to slide off a slick surface it must first happen. If touch is to be dematerialized, it must
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first have materialized. Slick touch relies on the gestural system established within every
moment of use; thus, we again see disembodied hands, contorted specifically, suspended in a
blank space with iPhone, hovering.
iPhone’s deep touch, alternately, relies on the ability of iPhone’s interface to disappear
even as it is touched. In the moment of use, iPhone’s material form is displaced at the same time
and because the interface—the screen—disappears. In short: “Tap an app to open it,”79 we are
told, and in the tapping of the app it is imagined that we reach through the screen, even past the
interface with which we reach. It is not simply that iPhone through gesture is meshed with our
hand, that the device is made “unconsciously familiar…like another appendage, or an appendage
enfolded within the body.”80 Instead, this unconscious familiarity becomes the basis on which
tactility is virtualized as visual, a tactility that creates a visual illusion of depth. In part, this
visual tactility exploits the biological intertwining of vision and touch: Easton, Greene, and
Srinivas, examining the explicit and implicit memory of 2D and 3D objects, found that explicit
memory—conscious memory—works from “modality-specific” sensory information to recall
and interact with objects, while implicit memory—subconscious memory e.g. you remember
how to tie your shoes, but you do not have to consciously work through the steps every time you
do it—works from “modality-independent” information. This suggests that “vision and haptics
shared abstract representations of object shape and structure,”81 even if we remember the
modality through which we experience the object. This is to say that vision and touch would
share the abstract representation of the table, even if, as find Roberta L. Klatzky and Susan J.
Lederman, “contrary to vision, haptic processing of common objects is impaired by reduced
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spatial dimensionality” indexing “fundamental differences in object perception across the
modalities.”82 Visual and tactile/haptic information is intertwined insofar as the information
received is abstracted: “the technologically extended hand takes on the same characteristics of
the technologically extended eye; it is abstracted from the body and rationalized.”83
iPhone’s interface, with its emphasis on colorful icons depends on the intertwining of
vision and touch on an abstract level; the screen displays icons that are purely visual and have
only an imaginary relation to the screen itself. As Wendy Hui Kyong Chun suggests, “software,
or perhaps more precisely operating systems, offer us an imaginary relationship to our hardware:
they do not represent transistors but rather desktops and recycling bins.”84 For iPhone, this
imaginary relationship is intensified, though, because, if the representation of ‘desktops and
recycling bins’ elides the representation of transistors and other hardware, the representation of
square icons elides the representation of ‘desktops and recycling bins.’ These icons abstract from
the abstract or interject another imaginary relation between us and a relation that was already
imaginary. Doubling occurs insofar as this imaginary relation itself relies on a touch-based
interface that virtualizes touch in the moment that touch occurs. Purely visual icons demand a
virtual touch that is predicated by a physical touch, but that disappears in the moment of its
appearance. This is merely to say, again, that in touching the screen we touch through the screen,
or that our touch is virtualized and visualized as the app opens. A virtual depth—a deep touch—
is constructed insofar as the interface “erases the traces of its own functioning (in actually
delivering the thing represented beyond), the more it succeeds in its functional mandate…the
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more intuitive a device becomes, the more it risks falling out of media altogether.”85 Deep touch
underlines the real fact of the interface even as it discards this fact.
The introduction of iPhone 6s and 6s Plus and the new “3D Touch” feature dramatically
illustrates deep touch (even in its title). 3D Touch, apparently, “introduces an entirely new way
to interact with your phone. For the first time, iPhone senses how much pressure you apply to the
display.”86 Basically, 3D both allows for the use of two new types of pressure based gestures—
‘Peek’ and ‘Pop’—and taps back using the phone’s inbuilt ‘Taptic Engine,’ which, of course,
includes a portmanteau of the words ‘tap’ and ‘haptic,’ signaling the tactile response initiated by
a harder press. Peek and Pop, through different levels of pressure while pressing, bring up
condensed menus of frequently used app functions, images of emails and documents that are
accessed without opening the document, allowing for quicker access.
Although the screen itself remains hard, smooth, and flat, and 3D
Touch itself is based on different levels of pressure, the technology itself
is described both on Apple’s website and in a 30 second ad simply called
3D Touch as adding another level of ‘depth’ to the experience of the
phone. Indeed, the ad tells us that while “nothing has changed” the
experience of iPhone now “feels different. Now, you press lightly to Peek
and deeper to Pop.”87 The new depth, as the overlay at the end of the ad
says, creates a sense that “the only thing that’s changed is everything.”88
It is a depth on two levels then: there is a depth virtualized by touch’s
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pressure and a depth of experience. The ad depicts groups of happy people being together,
largely outdoors. This depth activates up the magic included in iPhone’s brand—this depth of
experience is revolutionary, reinstating the practical magic described in ‘Midnight.’ 3D Touch,
apparently, deepens your experience of other people and the environment even as it deepens your
experience of iPhone by further extending its interface’s virtual depth. For it is not simply that a
harder press is imagined as going deeper, structuring a heightened sense of intimacy through the
use of subtle differences of pressure. The use of these gestures visualizes depth (figure 5). When
you press ‘deeper’ and ‘pop’ into an app, a menu appears over the app icon. This menu and its
app icon remain clearly visible, while everything else on the screen blurs and fades, creating a
contrast between virtual below and a virtual above. Depth’s virtuality, here, depends on a
transference between touch and vision. If as Michael Taussig writes, “with the invention of the
19th century technology of optical reproduction of reality... [a] connection with tactility is
paramount, [an] optical dissolving, as it were, into touch,”89 here we might say that a tactility
dissolves into optics. As we touch the screen and touch through the screen, we also touch icons
and information, documents and data: we ‘touch’ objects that are purely and only visual. 3D
Touch exemplifies and deepens this deep and visual touch by augmenting it with a visually
virtual depth. Tactility, which for Mark B.N. Hansen is ‘primordial,’ insofar as it is the
undifferentiated sensory field that exists prior to distinctions between what we think of as
senses,90 is, here, virtualized. Here, a rhetoric of dematerialization is embodied by the user and
iPhone as a reorganization of tactility contained within performances of and with iPhone.
Reorganizing tactility as slick and deep touch combines the rhetoric of dematerialization that
structures gesture on and with iPhone as a disciplinary subjectivation with a kind of implicit
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magic—the screen disappears, and we can interact directly with intangible data. We perform
with iPhone only inside of a dematerialized, magical tactile experience.
Erotic Dematerialization
As I describe in the second chapter, these magical experiences are one way in which
iPhone manages to virtualize the space around its user, but, here, I wish to stress that magic
originating in images in the user manual and, as we will see, ad material for the original iPhone,
extends beyond these images into everyday life. The representation of hands in the user manual
does not just deploy a vision of the body as dismembered, in other words; it uses this
dismembered body to construct a ‘magical’ aura around the device, an aura that subsequently
attracts body parts magnetically through the delivery of magical life experiences, like those
represented in “Midnight” and in “3D Touch.” In this section, I describe this magic as a
fetishistic operation with multiple valences.
To recapitulate, we do not see iPhone itself depicted in the user manual. Instead, as in
figures 1 and 4, taken from the ‘Basics’ section of the manual, the screen is represented as
disembedded from its material context. Instead of the device itself, we see its abstraction: a
thinly drawn rectangle representing just the screen. Some part of this is utilitarian, as the point,
here, is to show users how to interact with the device using the
gestural interface; in parts of the manual instructing users about
functionalities of iPhone that extend beyond the screen and the
interface itself such as changing the screen orientation and muting the
sound using the physical switch on the side of the phone, these
physical/material parts of the device are directly represented.91 The
91
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larger point here, however, is that the gestural, touch-based interface itself disregards the
materiality of the device. In figures 1 and 4, and throughout the iPhone user manual, hands are
depicted as interacting with and gesturing with/on a screen that is disembedded and abstracted
from its material context; the screen appears to float, magically decontextualized in a blank white
space.
This is consistent with how Ryan Diduck describes iPhone’s brand: it is “designed to
simply make consumers believe they are magical,”92 a belief that emerged, in part, from early ads
that “depict uncannily disembodied hands emerging from darkness, cradling and caressing the
divine devices.”93 As a result, Diduck refers to iPhone and especially its “slick trademarked
screen” as ‘totemic,”94 and it is true that iPhone seems to “want to be your friend and
companion.”95 The introduction of Siri, for instance, lets me talk to my iPhone and gives it the
capability to respond, even if, as Emily McArthur writes, “Siri’s acts of translation are not
always successful, and the program’ missteps work to break down its carefully constructed
[companionate] aura.”96 At the same time, however, as indexed by Diduck’s choice of ‘cradling’
and ‘caressing’ to describe how early iPhone ads depicted (and forecasted) our relation to
iPhone, there is a curious erotics involved with our relation to iPhone that can only be described
as fetishistic: “Fetishes…characteristically want to be beheld—to ‘be held’ close by, or even
reattached to, the body of the fetishist.”97 “To be held,” to be cradled, and to be caressed
construct a tactile progression in which erotic investiture is increased as one progresses through
each tactile mode; caressing something, that is, connotes a greater erotic content than cradling
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something, while cradling something connotes a greater erotic content than simply holding
something. Indeed, Claudia Springer, writing about cyberpunk, emphasizes the erotic nature of
the interface with technology more generally, suggesting that cyberpunk envisions a bodiless
sexuality that “associates the human/computer interface with sexual pleasure.”98 That iPhone’s
gestural interface demands a fetishistic erotics might be, then, unsurprising, especially
considering that holding, cradling, and caressing—as increasingly eroticized forms of touch—are
collapsed by and in its interface. iPhone, of course, must be held, and this holding is structured
by iPhone as cradling. Heidi Rae Cooley calls this cradling ‘fit:’
Fit…is an innervating exchange between hand and MSD [mobile screenic device]. In
articulating with the MSD, the hand-wrist complex is engaged in precision
handling…The MSD’s texturing, size, and ergonomic shape motivate the hand to execute
fine adjustments continuously as it engages in ‘active touch.’99
Cooley is writing in 2004, before the introduction and widespread adoption of iPhone, so
the MSDs to which she refers are now outmoded, but ‘fit’ remains useful as a concept that helps
to explain the gestural economy between iPhone and its user, underlining the ways in which
iPhone even physically appears to make demands on and change the body’s orientation to it.
Indeed, Jobs, in the keynote introducing the original iPhone emphasizes the way the device fits
in the hand. In his discussion of that device’s design, he says that Apple has “designed something
wonderful for your hand,”100 accenting iPhone’s match with the hand—it fits in the hand in a
‘wonderful’ way that allows for the precise performance demanded by its interface. But though
Jobs says that the device is wonderful for your hand, the slide behind him says that iPhone is
“something wonderful in your hand” (emphasis added). This slight prepositional shift spotlights
two aspects of iPhone’s magic. As already stated, if the device is wonderful for your hand, the fit
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between the hand and the device are emphasized, and the magic radiates out from the
interaction—the performance, the gesture. If the device is wonderful in your hand, on the other
hand, the device itself exudes magic, though this is a magic dependent on its design rather than
on the physical device itself. Jobs’ articulates wonder to design, and this wonder emerges from a
list of designed qualities such as extreme (and exceptional) thinness, a large screen with high
resolution, and few buttons. Underlining how design vis-à-vis iPhone refers to a collection of
purely aesthetic and immaterial qualities rather than their physical manifestations, the
demonstration of these qualities utilizes a simulated image of iPhone projected on a screen,
rather than a physical device, even though Jobs has one in his pocket. This image is rotated,
flipped, and inverted, and arrows, numbers, and labels appear that help to describe each quality.
The magic of the device that is wonderful in your hand emerges from aesthetic qualities attached
to a simulated, immaterial version of that device.
These two senses of wonderment work together to build an experience that is delivered as
magical and that remains magical through each interaction with iPhone. Each interaction
produces and reproduces the magic that attracts us to iPhone in the first place, operating as a
continuously magnetic demand. Consequently, the articulation actualized by performing iPhone,
construed as a certain kind of ‘fit,’ finally demands that we caress iPhone and continue to caress
it. The invitation to touch structured by gestural articulation, slick touch, and deep touch morphs
into a demand. On page 11 of the user manual, we read that
only “a few simple gestures—tap, drag, swipe, and pinch—are
all you need to use iPhone and its apps.” Other than ‘tap,’ these
gestures are depicted as forms of caress (figure 5); to interact
Figure 5

with iPhone, we must pet it, stroke it, and caress it.

49

But iPhone’s ‘demand’ is not, of course, truly a demand, nor is its function as fetish
simply erotic. Instead, this eroticism merges with the magic exuded by iPhone into a more
extensive actualization of the fetish, one that combines notions of fetishistic magic with notions
of fetishistic desire in part simply because it is a commodity. As I describe in the introduction,
Marx’s commodity fetishism is, in one sense, a recapitulation of earlier anthropological accounts
of so-called ‘savage’ religions designed as a (rather sarcastic) attack on the relation of selfrighteously rational European capitalists to abstract capital; this fetishism might be most clearly
outlined as a kind of animism whereby “material conditions are themselves spiritual values.”101
Fetish objects, here, are “attributed intentional purpose and desire” or are “personified things.”102
iPhone exhibits these by appearing to want to be touched.
Of course, this purpose and desire are only attributed, and the magic of the object that
appears to wield human purpose and desire is, more or less, illusory. It is precisely this
illusoriness, however, that grants commodities the actual power that they hold over the people to
whom they relate. Terry Eagleton suggests that through the commodity, “the real workings of
society are…veiled and occluded: the social character of labour is concealed behind the
circulation of commodities, which are no longer recognizable as social products.”103 Relations
between and among commodities and relations between humans and commodities are
emphasized and the real social and material conditions that structure them are experientially
dematerialized, which gives to the former “a tyrannical sway over social relations.”104 The
commodity and its fetishism, here, become the focal point for the workings of an ideology that
conjures an illusory world of magical commodities (that has, of course, real power and
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significant effects) in the place of a real world of relations between producers. The magic that
iPhone wields and that its advertising manifests helps to invoke such a world. iPhone appears to
appear, out of thin air, a fully formed person-thing complete with desires and purposes. Its
desires and purposes are, though, oriented toward the user—as in “Midnight,” iPhone delivers
magical experiences when caressed and, what’s more, it appears to want to deliver these
experiences. It wants to labor on my behalf.
Commodity fetishism vis-à-vis iPhone seems to braid magical and erotic valences of
fetishism into one coherent experience. Important to remember, however, is that my imagining of
gesture articulates human bodies with objects in such a way that bodies and objects can be
considered as one larger gestural assemblage. If iPhone’s desire to be caressed—its fetishistic
desire to be ‘reattached’ to me—105 erotically saturates the suture between it and myself, this
erotic saturation can only be described as my own desire returning to myself through iPhone. If
labor invested in commodities subtends a commodity fetishism that allows iPhone to appear to
labor on my behalf by transmuting human labor into non-human capabilities, within the system
established between myself and iPhone through gesture, my desire returns to me as if it is
iPhone’s—it wants to be touched and it wants to work for me. In touching iPhone and being
articulated with it, that is, I am touching myself. Indeed, as Baudrillard in Xerox and Infinity
suggests of the computer:
the Other, the sexual or cognitive interlocutor, is never really aimed at—crossing the
screen evokes the crossing of the mirror. The screen itself is targeted as the point of
interface…The secret of the interface is that the Other is within it virtually the Same.106
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As Springer suggests, Baudrillard here implies a kind of autoeroticism of the interface, an
autoeroticism that is heightened by my interface with iPhone.107
More accurately, however, the system created by gestural articulation with iPhone
consists of a libidinal circuit in which libidinal energy invested is entered into a kind of feedback
loop through which it is increased at every passage through the circuit. Investing desire in iPhone
is not merely erotic, that is. Instead, the investiture of erotic energy manifests a more primordial
sort of libidinal economy that is the “drive-based origin and energetic source” of both the
iPhone’s sexual economy and the political economy that brings it into being.108 Both, that is,
emerge from attempts to fulfill wants and needs, or from the desire that takes shape as just this
attempt. This implies two linked contradictions. First, I desire iPhone; it appears to desire me.
Each turn represents an investment of libidinal energy into the either the phone or myself, but
because this energy emerges from inside the system rather than outside of it, this amounts to
constant cycle of investment, dis-investment, and re-investment in which I become more
intensely attached to iPhone through every use. The contradiction, here, is that because this is a
closed system, no energy can escape implying that my attachment to this object would increase
ad infinitum. As Bernard Stiegler suggests, in consumer capitalism, “desire is protention—an
infinite investment in its object.”109
How, then, could I bear to dispose of such an object, a disposal that consumer capitalism
necessitates? This is the second contradiction. Stiegler suggests contemporary industrial
capitalism “controls the individual and collective behavior of consumers by channeling their
libidinal energy toward commodities—by provoking the investment of desire in the object of
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consumption it becomes possible to derive profits from industrial investment in the apparatus of
production.”110 More simply, to profit from controlling the means of production, when what is
produced is not strictly necessary for living, capitalists must provoke consumers to want the
commodities they produce. This ‘wanting’ invests libidinal energy both in the moment that one
first sees an iPhone ad (I want that) and in individual moments of use that are always predicated
by wanting to use iPhone. This ongoing investment of libidinal energy in iPhone harmonizes
contrapuntally with the goal of “consumerist fantasy…The object of consumption, as soon as it
is invested, must be dis-invested: consumerism is an economy of disposability, that is, of
infidelity.”111 Capitalists and marketers must convince consumers that the very same object
deserves both investment and disposability in order to continue to profit from the feedback loop
instantiated by the libidinal system established between iPhone and myself.
In relation to iPhone, dematerialization, construed as the overall impulse toward the
evaporation of material elements of the commodity, an impulse that has both material and
immaterial consequences, emerges as a subliminal attempt to displace these contradictions before
they can be transposed into crises, which temporarily resolves them. To preserve the overall
metastability of the capitalist order, dematerialization mediates libidinal investment in iPhone by
provoking such investment only through its immaterial functions (interface), aesthetic qualities,
and magical aura (brand). iPhone fetishism, that is, urges us to invest in an idealized version of
iPhone that is only ever imperfectly instantiated. Dematerialization encourages us to invest in the
idea of iPhone—its perceived ability to labor on our behalf, its fetishistic magic—rather than in
the object itself. Its material consequences (such as, for instance, the elimination of the home
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button and the headphone jack from the most recent iPhone) underline how this intensely
ideological process has more than imaginary effects: we invest in the idea of iPhone, and this
investiture takes shape as a promise that iPhone will, at some point, actually disappear, a promise
that must ironically remain unfulfilled.
Crucially, if iPhone advertising establishes a constitutive rhetoric that incorporates users
into a brand community of a specific kind of user, the contradiction that dematerialization
displaces (and in displacing, illuminates) requires this user to be split. She must be a user at once
attached to the iPhone, investing in it, and unattached to the iPhone, disinvesting in it. The
contradiction, then, exists 1) at the level of a general economy, 2) between iPhone and its user as
a process of autoerotic libidinal investment and disinvestment, and 3) within the user herself,
taking the shape of a user who invests and a user who disinvests. iPhone, its marketing, and its
interface must legitimate both, though, for dematerialization to adequately displace the
contradiction. Freud’s later conception of fetishism offers a valuable rubric for explicating how
this might occur, especially considering that iPhone’s function as a fetish structures in large part
its delivery of a doubled user.
As I described in the introduction, the fetish in Freud’s description is a kind of talisman
unconsciously created by the male fetishist to ward against the fear of castration, though its
function as ward always indexes the fear that it is meant to displace. Fetishes maintain the
existence of the fear of castration through the creation of the ward against it. This allows the
fetishist to operate as if sexually normal while preserving a sexual aberration. The fetish at once
legitimates the fetishist as fetishist and as normal—the fetishist is split and his (for fetishists are,
for Freud, always male) orientation to the world through the fetish is contradictory.112 As for the
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sexual fetishist, so for the iPhone fetishist: it is not simply that the rhetoric of dematerialization
constitutes the user as contradictorily split. It is also that both ‘users’ are legitimated in the same
moment by the same discourse. Fetishism and dematerialization do not simply operate externally
to displace or resolve the contradictions that emerge from consumer capitalism. They operate
within the subject herself, constituting a contradictory subjectivity that displaces its own
contradiction into the future, in the service of maintaining the overall metastability of the
capitalist order.
The Human Family: Self-Composure, Selfie Arm, and the Emptied Space
However, the two major aspects of iPhone fetishism—its generation of a libidinal circuit
and its constitution of a contradictory user subjectivity—are not merely magical. Instead, they
have significant structuring effects on iPhone practice as well. Practice and magic are never
disarticulated, only ever appearing as a kind of practical magic. If, as I outline in the
introduction, rhetorics of dematerialization are performed as attachment to an ideal, ideological
version of iPhone, practical magic emerges as just this performance. In performing attachment,
the user inhabits the space between individual motion and ideological mandates—rhetorics of
dematerialization and iPhone fetishism script gestural performances of attachment, though those
gestures are not determined by their scripts. As Juana María Rodríguez suggests, “gestures
exceed the intentions of their signification without ever becoming more than their own
momentary expression.”113 Although her work provides a reparative reading of various social
phenomena in the service of providing an account of queer Latina gestures typically read as
excessive, this understanding of gesture also applies to iPhone’s practical magic. Performances
of attachment to iPhone are not fully determined by ideological forces like rhetorics of
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dematerialization because they depend on gestures that can express individual and group
preferences and epistemologies. At the same time, these gestures’ personal expressiveness is
tempered by their ideologically scripted nature.
Gesturally practically magic instantiates the two major aspects of iPhone fetishism as
specific forms of practice. Gestural practice appears as if expressive of a user’s individuality, but
these practices are provisioned by the brand’s magic, a provisioning that is subsequently hidden.
To show this, my analysis now turns to Apple’s “The Human Family,” an ad for iPhone 7’s
camera. This ad, I will show, reformats the user’s contradictory subjectivity as a manipulable
divide between image and body and presents a practical instance of iPhone’s libidinal circuitry in
what I will call “selfie arm.” Although these appear to be purely personal and expressive selfportraits, I contend that their appearance within an emptied space signifies their constant relation
to iPhone’s brand and its magic.
“The Human Family” has a five-part formal structure. First, the ad shows a series of still
images and videos that are all portraits. Second, each portrait is paired with an attribution
underneath it, formulated as a first name and a last initial. Third, vaguely inspirational music
plays in the background. Over a jangly electric guitar that quickly strums major thirds, a piano
arpeggiates those same chords in the right hand, while the left hand softly touches them in a
lower register. The piano begins and ends by playing the same major chord, but with the
difference of an octave. Passing from low and soft to higher and louder, the overall impression
during this minute is slow uplift. This is not quite the celebration Apple proffered it as in their
press release about the ad,114 but it does imply a certain kind of inspirational affective experience.
Fourth, alongside the music, we hear Maya Angelou reciting her poem “Human Family,” which
114
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ends with the lines “we are more alike, my friends, / than we are unalike.”115 Finally, there is the
emptied space itself, constituting an unshifting white border around the shifting space in which
the images are displayed. This section provides a close reading of the ad, specifically the relation
between the images displayed and the emptied space, examining how the ad uses selfies to
construct each of these selfie takers as self-fashioning, ‘diverse,’ individuals—even though not
all the images shown are selfies—and how the diversity and individuality of the selfie takers
displayed is at once expressed and submitted to corporate control as represented by the emptied
space.
These images are portraits, though only some of them are self-portraits. This might seem
to be an obvious—and minor—distinction. However, I want to suggest, here, that the placement
of portraits marked as selfies alongside portraits that are not marked as selfies informs the viewer
to read these non-selfies as selfies, sublimating portraiture to the selfie and foreshadowing the
way that the ad sublimates these instances of self-portraiture to the white space. As Gannon and
Prothero suggest, selfies are a distinct genre of self-photography “because the taker, and often
his/her arm, is in the frame, thus making visible the construction of the image.”116 In the ad, all
the selfies are of this style, clearly marked by what I will call here the selfie arm. Selfie arm, I
suggest, makes visible the construction of the image as well as more firmly centering the
photographer in the photo, which at the same time centers the photographer’s active role in the
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manipulation of her own image. In figure 6, selfie arm is displayed by the woman centered in the
frame: her shoulder is slightly raised and her right arm is raised and extends out of frame. Selfie
arm establishes an implied intimacy between the phone and the photographer by indexing an out
of frame touch but it also
serves to privilege the
photographer over any other
person in the image. The other
woman in figure 1, for instance,
seems to struggle to enter the
frame, looming awkwardly
Figure 6

over the photographer’s raised

shoulder. No matter who else is in the selfie, that is, the photographer, because of selfie arm is
who the branded selfie is of. Even though other kinds of selfie experiences—as I suggest in
chapter 2—offer a kind of collective photo booth experience that can structure collective positive
aspects, here, selfies are pictured as subsumed to the brand. Selfie arm constructs a sort of circuit
between the photographer and the phone, a circuit that implicitly excludes other persons in the
selfie who are imaged but not centralized. Selfie arm emerges as a dramatically represented
instantiation of the libidinal circuitry generated in using iPhone. The photographer appears to
smile directly at iPhone, at the same time grasping it. iPhone rewards the photographer by
representing her as central to both its world and hers. Although her smile indexes the
conventions of photography (say cheese!) as well as the affective experience of taking a selfie
with a friend or family member (joy or amusement), in this context we might also take her smile
as an indication of her affective experience of simply taking a selfie and, more generally, of the
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libidinal energy she invests in iPhone in the moment of selfie taking. Interestingly, however,
because the viewer of a selfie is placed in the position of the camera, the circuit created by selfie
arm subliminally connects the selfie-taker to the viewer. Simply, the selfie-taker appears to be
staring directly at us and touching us, which in turn draws our attention. Selfie arm is, then, a set
of gestures that implies a specific sort of relation among the persons imaged in the selfie,
between the selfie-taker and iPhone, and between the selfie-taker and the viewer who is, in
viewing the ad, equated with iPhone.
This is dramatically emphasized by
figure 7, also from “the Human Family.”
Selfie arm is demonstrated by the woman on
the bottom. Although she is laying on the
bed, her right shoulder is raised, and her arm
extends forward out of frame. She stares

Figure 7

smiling into the camera, while the woman
laying on top of her kisses her cheek. Crucially, although the woman on top is focused entirely
on the selfie-taker, and though the selfie-taker herself appears joyful because of this exchange,
she, herself, is focused entirely on the camera. This disjuncture centralizes the selfie-taker in the
image, almost separating the selfie into two images, a phenomenon encapsulated by each of the
women’s eyes. One image is a tender, almost awkwardly embarrassed, image of queer love
culminating in the lover’s gaze being directed toward the selfie-taker. This image underlies
another image, a selfie that becomes almost conspiratorial in its intimacy. The viewer, here, is
both shown a scene from an intimate relationship—it appears that these women are laying on a
bed—and is connected to the selfie-taker through the intimate gaze constructed by selfie arm.
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Contrasting intimacies lend the image a transgressive appeal. The real intimacy between iPhone
and its user—the libidinal circuit—is translated into a kind of pseudo-intimacy between the
selfie-taker and the viewer, especially when the selfie is purposefully constructed for the
purposes of sharing to a specifically defined audience. We are not, of course, in the room
pictured, but it feels as though we are in on a secret or that, perhaps, we are the secret. The
personal and expressive gestures actuated by selfie arm are translated into an appeal to an
audience that is equated with iPhone but that, because of physical distance, cannot be collapsed
into it.
Not all the images in “the Human Family” demonstrate selfie arm, of course, because not
all of them are selfies. However, features of the ad, I suggest, prime the viewer to interpret all the
images as selfies. The first few images we see exhibit selfie arm. Attributed to Arpana R., this is
a color photo of a young Native American woman standing in a desert environment, perhaps in
the Southwest United States. Although not completely visible, her left shoulder is raised in a
suggestion of selfie arm. The second image is a black and white photo of an older white man in
sunglasses and a cowboy hat, standing in an environment like that displayed in the first photo. In
the far background, we can make out the barest silhouette of a Ferris wheel and a circus tent. His
left shoulder is raised, and he stares directly into the camera, implying selfie arm. Although the
third image is a short black and white video of an Asian man and woman spinning around in
what appears to be an artistic exhibition of old streetlights, the man exhibits selfie arm, so
woman cranes her neck to force herself into the frame. It is not until the fifth image shown that
selfie arm is not exhibited. Even so, we cannot be sure that the woman imaged is not the
photographer, considering that we cannot see her body below her chin and that she looks directly
into the camera, addressing the viewer similarly to those images that demonstrate selfie arm. The
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next image is the first that is certainly not a selfie. Here, an older man looks up and to his left,
away from the camera. His shoulders are not lifted and we cannot see either of his arms.
After this image, we see eleven others—some videos and some photos. Eight of these do
not exhibit selfie arm, while three of them do; additionally, only one of them does not image a
subject looking directly into the camera. My suggestion is that even though there is a roughly
equivalent number of selfies and non-selfies represented, that the first four images are all
certainly selfies combined with the ways that the images maintain an almost unbroken direct
address to the viewer permits the viewer to read all the images as if they were selfies. Non-selfies
are sublimated to selfies. The ad, then, functions similarly to selfie arm by centering selfies in
‘frame’ and convincing viewers that non-selfies are selfies. Because this ad is established as one
that is ‘about’ selfies, each image lends to the series a sense of selfie ‘inertia’—it is easy to read
non-selfies as selfies because of the cumulative selfie momentum that the ad has already accrued.
Each image, then, is read as an image the photographer herself, as if the object of the
selfie is the subject of the selfie. That is (perhaps too obviously), each image appears selffashioned or self-composed. The circuitry between the phone and photographer introduced,
implied, and amplified by selfie arm consistently functions to provide the experience of selfcomposure to the user of the phone—gesture expresses who the user is. At the same time,
however, this self-composure also indicates a cleavage between the selfie-taker’s image and her
body. As Roland Barthes writes of self-portraiture before digital photography, “‘myself’ never
coincides with my image.”117 My portrait marks “the advent of myself as other: a cunning
dissociation of consciousness from identity.”118 In the self-portrait, I see the self who is not the
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self, the self who I have passed by, who I am but no longer can be. I know that who I see in the
self-portrait is me, but it remains differently embodied. It indexes a “that-has-been,”119 a
confirmation “that the object has been real,”120 the object being in this case the self-embedded in
a context that has passed.
Although selfies and other digital imagery do manifest directly as images—when I take a
selfie I automatically see it—they also automatically present a gap between the image and
captured light, a gap that is filled in with editing technologies. This is because digital images are
not directly transposed onto a material medium, as with film. Instead, as Lev Manovich writes:
representing even one image digitally requires lots of numbers. For example, an image
with HD resolution (1920x1080) contains 2,073,600 pixels, or 6,220,800 distinct RGB
values—making it impossibly hard to comprehend the patterns such sets of numbers may
represent if you examine these numbers directly.121
Digital images present as images but are essentially data, and in between are processes of
visualization that allow that data to appear as an image. This means that digital images are
manipulable after the point of capture in a way that film images are not. Apps like Instagram, for
instance, allow the user to upload images, and then edit and apply various filters to them.
iPhone’s camera interface, further, includes some of these same features, allowing users to
directly and immediately manipulate the images they capture. If film self-portraits distinguish
between the self and the image, consciousness and identity, as per Barthes, digital selfies
distinguish between the image and the body. Selfies do not index a specific “that-has-been” for
the iPhone user; instead, they provide a resource that can and must be edited and manipulated to
become presentable. It still necessarily was, but it no longer must remain that way. With selfies,
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the confrontation with the self as other puts it under my control, even as it remains in an object
that is not myself. The contradictory subjectivity inaugurated by iPhone fetishism manifests here
as an imaged me that is fully invested in iPhone—that requires iPhone to exist—and as the
embodied me that controls my own imaging. iPhone entices me to self-compose.
“The Human Family” operates under the assumption that the subject/object of the selfie
is a self-composed individual. Beyond Maya Angelou’s recitation and the byline attributing each
image to its creator, they are all presented without comment, which makes it appear as if these
images are displayed just as their diverse creators imagined them. Since they are all read as
selfies, these images appear to be a direct representation of how these diverse individuals wish to
portray themselves. However, selfie arm’s direct address to its viewer—that it directs the look of
the subject/object of the selfie to the viewer—underlines how selfie arm, as a set of gestures, is
never only personally expressive and how it also performs under the aegis of broader ideological
forces and for an audience. Because selfies generate pseudo-intimacy between the subject/object
of the selfie and the viewer by 1) looking at the viewer and 2) placing the viewer in the position
of the camera that is touched, allowing the subject/object of the selfie to virtually touch the
viewer, selfies—even those created using an inner facing camera—are faced outward toward
both an audience of presumably self-composed individuals and toward the structuring power of
iPhone’s ideological magic. This means that “in some instances and certain moments, the lived
experience of selfies can indeed possess a quality of emancipatory liberation,”122 while in others
“such means of self-documentation are used to shape and discipline our actions, both
individually and as a society.”123 “The Human Family’s” presentation of individuals constructed
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as diverse through self-documentation, then, might implicitly entangle the experience of selfcomposure associated with taking selfies to larger forms of corporate and peer-to-peer
surveillance and control. Said differently, the space between self and selfie can be filled with
both technologies of self-composure and techniques of social control both of which are activated
through selfie arm. This, I contend, is represented by the interplay between and among the
image space of the ad, the bylines under each image, and especially the emptied space.
The images in “The Human Family” are all rectangular, though they are all different
sizes. This means that the space in which they appear is constantly changing. By contrast, the
emptied space has specific dimensions that do not change, even though the mathematical area of
the emptied space changes along with the area of the image space. As the image space becomes
larger in area, the emptied space becomes smaller in area, while the height and width of the
emptied space remain constant. Image space is always within the emptied space and is
constituted by it; emptied space defines and delimits the variable image space.
This dynamic vividly visualizes how Deleuze describes controls: “Enclosures are molds,
distinct castings, but controls are a modulation, like a self-deforming cast that will continuously
change from one moment to the other, or like a sieve whose mesh will transmute from point to
point.”124 Emptied space images this control. It modulates in response to certain actions by
individual images and, in so doing, restricts the ads image space to certain dimensions. The
emptied space appears to change, that is, while remaining emptied; in effect, it ‘appeases’ the
images by allowing them to change, even as its overall structure and mechanism remains the
same. Crucially, this sort of control provides individual agency, but only within certain bounds.
In the ad, image space can become larger and smaller depending on the size of the currently
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displayed image, but it can never exceed the boundaries of the control mechanism put into place.
Emptied space controls by providing individual agency only in defined limits. Self-composure
can be maintained even as it is provisioned through control by the emptied space.
Further, because the emptied space is white—because nothing about it catches the eye—
it is easily overlooked. However, this ability to be overlooked is crucial to its operation as a
more-than-metaphorical mechanism of control. What might be found in this overlooked space
once one looks at it? In “the Human Family,” curiously, one finds bylines. Figure 8 is the image
of a young girl staring into the camera. She smiles, revealing braces. However, this image is
attributed to “Jorge S.,” not really a unisex name, meaning that this girl is implied as not the
image taker. Intriguingly, if
you look closely, you can
make out the silhouetted
figure of another person in the
girl’s eyes, underlining that
this image is not a selfie. The
girl, though, stares directly

Figure 8

into the camera, and
considering my comments above on how the viewer has been primed to read all these images as
selfies, this look can be contextually interpreted as part of selfie arm, that is, as constitutive of a
sort of intimacy between the object of the image and the viewer based on formal characteristics
of the selfie.
There is a disjunction between the way that the image is displayed and contextualized and
its attribution. This disjunction, however, is sublimated to the emptied space because the
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attribution—the byline—is only in the white space. Because the emptied space is naturally
overlooked, that which is in the emptied space is also overlooked. That is, the byline becomes
invisible because it is placed within the emptied space and outside of the intimacy created by the
display of the series of selfies. This both further emphasizes how “the Human Family” asks its
viewers to read all the images it displays as selfies, and how selfies are formally and structurally
outward facing and constituted by surveillance and mechanisms of control. What’s more, it
underlines the distinction between image and body that selfies maintain for it is only because of
this distinction that images that are read as selfies can be attributed to people who are not in the
selfie at all.
That this invisible, dematerialized other—the photographer of the selfie revealed as
someone other than its object—resides only in the emptied space (through the attribution)
emphasizes how the emptied space functions as a mechanism of a scripted control that
establishes an aura of self-composure. Though we might presume that the photographer posed
the young woman in figure 3, this incitement to pose—this kind of informal control—is crossed
out and associated with the emptied space; because the emptied space frames each image as if
each were of a self-composed selfie-taker, the informal control of the pose appears as if in the
hands of the young woman herself. Finally, even this kind of tensely negotiated practical magic
is articulated to the brand through the emptied space. At the end of the ad, the words “Shot on
iPhone” appear, representing the culmination of both the attributions and the images themselves.
It functions as an attribution because it is in the same typeface as the others and maintains a
similarly referential position; “Shot on iPhone” refers to the ad and to the series of images and
attributions displayed. But it also appears as if an image—a selfie—because it is centered in
frame and modulated by the white space. The human family represented in the ad, then,
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ultimately is framed as the perfect product of iPhone’s brand—the ad becomes legible as a selfie
of the brand itself. Each self-composed image becomes an instance of the brand replicating itself.
Even as selfie arm marks each image with individualized personality, the emptied space of
iPhone’s brand magic manufactures each instance of self-composure as an instantiation of
iPhone’s dematerialized economy. Emptied space, in fact, appears as the condition of possibility
for self-composure, but a condition that must remain invisible in order to function as a
mechanism of control.
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The Emptied Space: iPhone, Emic Performance, and Etic Observation
In the last chapter, I described how iPhone’s rhetorics of dematerialization function as a
kind of practical magic: they script the gestures with which we perform iPhone and offer these
gestures as avenues for, ultimately, a kind of creative self-composure. Gesture vis-à-vis the
rhetorics of dematerialization operates as a joint nexus of social and self-control. As
demonstrated by my analysis of emptied space in “The Human Family,” iPhone’s brand magic
structures and defines, though never absolutely, everyday practice with iPhone, by functioning as
the condition of possibility for a self-composure within ideological limits.
But the emptied space is not merely a representational phenomenon. In the introduction, I
suggest that iPhone generates the scene for its own performance. In being embodied and
performed, the rhetorics of dematerialization saturate the space around the performing user,
dematerializing her local spatial context and actualizing the emptied space. That this emptied
space presents itself as if it were not a scene—as if it were removed from contextual space and
time, from history and politics—is precisely the effect that this chapter will analyze, for this
apparent lack of scene is the iPhone’s self-generated scene. This chapter argues 1) that
performing iPhone, a phrase that captures both how the user performs the device and how iPhone
itself appears to perform, actualizes the emptied space and 2) that because the emptied space
appears empty it produces an incitement to “fill in” the space, meaning that emptied space
induces the user to creatively perform the self and the space. The user becomes an artist whose
medium is the self and the emptied space. That this space is emptied rather than empty—there
was something there before that has been forced to recede—emphasizes how this space relies on
rhetorics of dematerialization. Performance space is, as Ngũgi ̃ wa Thiong’o suggests, “bare, yes,
open, yes but never empty [and] always the site of physical, social, and psychic forces in
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society,”125 meaning that, for iPhone’s emptied space, it is only the rhetorics of dematerialization
that allow the emptied space to appear as if disconnected from both the user’s local environment
and Apple’s provision of iPhone to users. Emptied space functions as a medium for users’
artistry only insofar as rhetorics of dematerialization convince users that iPhone was built solely
for them, a device that grants them creative power over their image and themselves.
To defend this argument, I will first analyze Apple ad material in order to show how
Apple envisions the emptied space. This material has used the emptied space through every
iteration of iPhone, meaning that iPhone has always been delivered with its promise. Next, I turn
to instances of the emptied space’s actualization. I analyze a viral video of college-aged women
taking selfies at an MLB baseball and videos from a US government anti-distracted driving
campaign to show how the emptied space quite literally removes users from everyday space.
From the outside, this appears as narcissism and distraction, though from the inside of emptied
space this appears as empowerment of the self and the building of affective bonds among friends.
Lastly, I examine MyFitnessPal, a fitness app, in order to show how emptied space provides the
scene for the establishment of a new self and a new world and to underline how emptied space is
predicated on the dematerialization of its own origins in structures of corporate control and
dataveillance.
The Emptied Space in Apple Advertising for iPhone
Performing iPhone reformats proximal space into an emptied, virtual space in which the
only relevant context is performing iPhone. A noticeable trend in Apple’s advertising for the
iPhone has been the visualization of this emptied space, usually as white, though sometimes as
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black. Usually, such ads exhibit new features or new updates to the iPhone, placing their optimal
use in this emptied space.
“Watered Down,”126 a 2007 ad
for the original iPhone is one of the
first to visualize the emptied space
(figure 9). Not only does this ad
exemplify the dismemberment of the
Figure 9: Screengrab from “Watered Down,” 2007

body on which gestural articulation
with iPhone is founded (chapter 1), it also, in contrast with an earlier ad called “Hello,” which
attempted to place the iPhone as the culmination of the telephone’s history, emphasizes the
iPhone’s difference from previous smartphones. “This is not,” the young male voice tells us, “a
watered-down version of the internet.” During this sentence, the white hands holding the phone
turn it horizontally, allowing the internet browser to enter landscape mode. These hands,
throughout the ad, swipe through various webpages, like the New York Times website,
displaying how fully functional the iPhone’s web browser is. All of this turning, swiping,
navigating—all this performance—hovers suspended within an empty black space. The frame
disconnects the space itself from other space that is necessarily contiguous with it, while the
hands are curiously disconnected from the rest of the body. Other space is implied, of course, but
it is never visualized. What is in the emptied space is just the iPhone, the world it seems to open
to my touch, and, in conjunction with the “Hello” ad, the update to the telephone that it embodies
through its new features.
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We find this empty space throughout iPhone’s advertising history and nearly exclusively
when new features or functions are introduced. “HeyHiHello,”127 an ad for the most recent
version of the iPhone’s operating
system, iOS 10, for instance, introduces
new functions of iPhone’s Messenger
app through use of the emptied space,
while also exemplifying how iPhone
appears as if an intimate friend, as I
Figure 10: From “HeyHiHello,” 2016

describe in chapter 1. Though white in
this incarnation, the space again provides the scene for the ideal or optimal performance of
certain new features of the iPhone. In figure 10, the implied user has just sent “Congratulations”
to her friend; as the message is delivered, confetti explodes from the top of the phone’s screen,
emphasizing the message. The phone floats within the emptied space, magically appearing as if
gifted from Apple to you. Performing iPhone allows old features to appear within the emptied
space only insofar as they are articulated to or overlaid with new features. Old habits are
updated, though this update is merely an image that disappears on arrival.
By presenting new features of the iPhone 1) as articulated to old features and 2) within an
uncluttered background that makes these features the focus, the emptied space provides the
necessary context for smooth updating. New potential habits connect to old habits. Both become
visible in this moment and only in this moment. As Wendy Hui Kyong Chun writes, habits “are
practices acquired through time that are seemingly forgotten as they move from the voluntary to
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the involuntary, the conscious to the automatic.”128 Media collect and generate habits, becoming
habitual, thus remaining as habits only “by disappearing from consciousness.”129 “Hey Hi
Hello,” and other ads that display new features also display new habits, and this display allows
old habits and features to reappear in contrast. The visibility of old habits allows new habits to
seem tenable or natural, while the visibility of new habits makes the old habits seem deficient. I
now want these new features and these new habits in part because the emptied space makes them
appear as if only for me—magical.
But though the emptied space appears as a vital representational resource for the
provocation of further consumption, thus including the user in its machinations, it also more
directly includes the user. A 2007 ad for the original iPhone called “Kristen: “The Winger,”130
dramatically visualizes the user’s inclusion in the emptied space, while at the same underlining
how the emptied space is only ever proximal. Kristen, a young, white woman, spends the ad in
the emptied space describing her blog:
she is a ballet dancer, and she uses her
iPhone to post images from the wings of
the ballet to her blog while not at home.
People can see, she says, what the
dancers are doing in real time, all thanks

Figure 11: From “Kristen: “The Winger,”” 2007

to the iPhone. Figure 11 appears at the
end of the ad. Kristen now sits outside on a black cloth while using her iPhone. This is likely an
attempt to make Kristen seem like a real person. We are seeing ‘backstage;’ the background
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behind Kristen appears now as a draped cloth, and we see the orange tape showing her where
should stand. At the same time, however, she now sits, head down, using her phone. The black
cloth voids part of the building behind her and separates her from the ground. A few seconds
later, a businesswoman with a briefcase disappears behind the cloth, and we never see her return;
Kristen in using the iPhone becomes, it seems, unaware of people passing by her. Indeed, they
disappear.
Kristen’s whole body is contained within the space delimited by the dimensions of the
cloth. This is the emptied space, inclusive of the user, proximal, and focused on optimal use of
the iPhone. That the name ‘iPhone’ appears in the center of the top portion of the black cloth
emphasizes that this scene is generated through performing iPhone. Using iPhone, again, voids
proximal space, proffering the iPhone itself as the only relevant context for its own use. It also,
though, mandates that the user throw herself bodily into the space when the she performs (with)
the iPhone.
It is not just the user’s body that is included in the space, however. iPhone ads suggest,
eerily, that subjective experience itself is articulated to this space. “Family Man,”131 a 2010 ad for
the iPhone 3GS, for instance, has a young husband and father narrating his family’s experience
with his iPhone. Set in the emptied space, we are never permitted to see the man. We see,
instead, his fingers tapping and swiping through the portions of his life accessible through the
iPhone. We see pictures and videos of his children, recipe apps for his wife, Sesame Street to
placate his son, while the man says, “as for me? I use it for just about everything.” This is paired
with an image of him opening with an iPhone app the back of his Volkswagen hatchback, an
outside object included in the emptied space only as it is articulated to the iPhone through an
131
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app. So useful, we think. How functional. But also: how necessary. The ad ends with these
words: “Yup, I think we’d all be lost without my iPhone!” Use and functionality yield to
necessity. The iPhone is not simply fun for the kids, or a nice thing to have around. Instead, it
comes to structure the collective experience of this family to such a degree that they could not
find their way in the world without it. They need it. This sort of need could only be developed
within the emptied space, because inclusion in the emptied space presupposes use of the iPhone
Performing iPhone becomes necessary to everyday life; it appears to descend into the
past, establishing itself as primary for experience. Because the iPhone proffers itself as the only
relevant condition for the generation of its performance space, to be included in that space is to
interact with the iPhone as if it is the only relevant condition for the generation of its
performance space. To be and to continue to be in the empty space is to continually move toward
the iPhone—to be and to continue to be in the empty space presupposes a need for the iPhone,
because the emptied space can only be generated by performing iPhone. On the other hand, this
space does not remain empty. Through use, it is filled with elements and objects from the user’s
life. Kristen uses the space to blog, sharing her life and her favorite activities, while the Family
Man places his car and, indeed, all the elements of his domestic life in the space. Though Kristen
is literally an artist and performer (she is a dancer), meaning that her use of the space is a direct
extension of her everyday life, the Family Man also becomes an artist. He remakes his own life
through his performance with iPhone because iPhone becomes vital to that life, and reimagines
the emptied space by filling it with aspects of his life. Performing iPhone creatively reorganizes
life as tied to use of iPhone, and this is reciprocated insofar as the life of the user fills in emptied
space.

74

Narcissism and Distraction: Performing Emptied Space
iPhone ads visualize the emptied space as the scene for the creative reciprocity between
iPhone’s reorganization of everyday life and the user’s ability to fill in the emptied space. In
performance, however, this reciprocity brings the emptied space off the screen, allowing it to
saturate and reformat the real space in which the user uses iPhone. In part, this reciprocity’s
establishment and reliance on a spatiality parallels how de Certeau describes strategies and
tactics. In relation to the city, he writes that strategies originate from a rational, ‘panoptic’
viewpoint, creating a theoretical ‘city’ made of marks that represent acts.132 From this vantage,
the city becomes a place where “each [element is] situated in its own ‘proper’ and distinct
location [implying] an indication of stability.”133 Tactics, on the other hand, imply that
“pedestrian movements […] are not localized; it is rather they that spatialize.”134 Though
institutions that create the idea of the theoretical city as a static place—through, especially,
maps—pedestrians tactically reappropriate these maps, and in doing this, transform a place into a
space: “A space exists when one takes into consideration vectors of direction, velocities, and
time variables […] Space occurs as the effect produced by the operations that orient it, situate it,
temporalize it, and make it function in a polyvalent unity of conflictual programs or contractual
proximities.”135 Overall, “the street geometrically defined by urban planning is transformed into a
space by walkers.”136 Strategies define the city as static locations mapped out, while pedestrian
tactics spatialize what is given, creatively reappropriating the idea of the city from a position of
relative weakness:137
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if it is true that a spatial order organizes an ensemble of possibilities (e.g., by a place in
which one can move) and interdictions (e.g., by a wall that prevents one from going
further), then the walker actualizes some of these possibilities. In that way, he makes
them exist as well as emerge. But he also moves them about and he invents others, since
the crossing, drifting away, or improvisation of walking privilege, transform or abandon
spatial elements.138
Walking around the city becomes a creative, tactical reorganization of the theoretical
place of the city; it resists the rational, panoptic vantage of the map by reusing and reworking
theoretical place. Performing place—walking around physically—transforms it into a space
filled with micro-resistant actions and meanings.
Performing iPhone is analogous to walking through the city as both are forms of
embodied movement that have the capacity to reinterpret and redesign theoretical places offered
by institutions of cultural power. The emptied space appears as a theoretical place, given by
Apple as emptied to users who then creatively and tactically fill it, respatializing it. However, the
emptied space differs from de Certeau’s city in two important ways. First, it anticipates its own
tactical usage. Users’ tactical reappropriation of emptied space is designed into iPhone, in part
because iPhone epitomizes the interactive device (or at least asserts this about itself). As Mark
Andrejevic writes, “the promise of interactivity is that viewers can be cultural produces as well
as consumers—that, furthermore, their participatory consumption can be creative and
fulfilling.”139 This sort of creativity vis-à-vis the ‘prosumer’ of the mid-2000’s—the media
consumer who is also a media producer, ah creative consumer—foreshadows how iPhone
provisions a space that invites and requires its own tactical reappropriation. Every space, in being
emptied, becomes interactive but only when performing iPhone, and this interactivity allows for
the creative revisioning of the self. What is important about iPhone is that the tactical
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reappropriation of the emptied space and the reciprocal “savvy recognition of the staging of self”
is designed into the emptied space. The emptied space, ironically, provides both the theoretical
place that is appropriated and the tactical means through which users might reappropriate it. It
represents a group of spatial tactics of reappropriation that have been absorbed into the strategy
conceived and implemented by Apple through iPhone (encouraging consumerism through
iPhone’s practical magic). These strategized tactics—the everyday gestures and moments of use
that I described in the previous chapter—appear to grant self-composure, but only within
invisible limits.
Second, the emptied space represents a potentially omni-present and abstracted version of
any space in which performing iPhone occurs. Though related to both, this space is different
from 1) that activated by previous forms of interactive technology because of iPhone’s insistence
on extreme mobility and 2) from, as I describe below, telephonic space, the transcendent space
developed through the telephone. As Mark B.N. Hansen suggests, “digital technologies are
literally virtualizing the physical” which, 140 with iPhone, includes the human user’s ability to
tactically perform space. Performing iPhone extracts the user from her specific location and
places her in the emptied space, which then moves with her as she moves. Because the user
enters a liminal, virtual space that is both inside and outside of her everyday location, emptied
space as actualized in performance can appear much different depending on one’s relation to it.
As my analysis will show, for those interior to the emptied space, it produces positive effects,
while for those exterior to the space, it appears to have negative effects. This, I show, is because,
while an emic performance manifests the emptied space, allowing insiders to fill emptied space
with their own actions and meanings, an etic observation applies already existing meanings to it

140

Hansen, Bodies in Code, 27.

77

after its manifestation. I will, first, examine a viral video in which the emptied space appears to
produce unfettered narcissism, and then analyze an anti-texting while driving campaign that
frames the emptied space as a platform for distraction.
Selfie just of a Selfie: Narcissism
Baseball is not a particularly exciting sport. It consists of long periods of inactivity
punctuated by short bursts of frenetic activity. In late September 2015, a group of sorority sisters
from Arizona State University, attending an Arizona Diamondbacks game, filled these long,
boring periods with selfie taking. Making faces and posing with hot dogs and churros, these
young women utilize selfie arm in performing iPhone. Generally, they look happy; they are
laughing, smiling, and appear as if they are having fun together as a group. The announcers, two
men, see this much differently, however. Even though video begins with the announcers urging
viewers to tweet their “strongest fan photo” with #azdatastrongfan so that they might be
“featured in an upcoming broadcast,”141 and even though the announcers explicitly relate the
women’s selfie taking to this campaign, the rest of the minute and a half long clip consists of the
announcers viciously mocking the women for their perceived self-obsession. After they
announce the selfie campaign, they immediately begin laughing. “Look at the one on the
right,”142 says one announcer, the other responding, “do you have to make faces when you take
selfies?” They go on to make sounds that seem intended to skewer the perceived stupidity of the
faces these women make into their cameras, while also making remarks that imply that these
women take far too many selfies (“That’s the best one of the 300 pictures I’ve taken of myself
today!).143 Crucially, about halfway through the video, one commentator says, “Every girl in the
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picture is locked into her phone!” The other responds, exasperated, “Oh lord.” It sounds as if he
is rolling his eyes. The first continues, “every single one, just dialed in. Welcome to parenting in
2015. They’re all just completely transfixed by the technology.” During this exchange, the
television camera is pointed at the young women, and they continue to take selfies, laughing,
smiling, and showing each other the pictures they are taking. But after this last comment, the
camera turns to the renewed action on the field: a pitch, an attempted bunt, and the pitch being
called a ball. It is clear that these selfies are taken during a period of inactivity on the field, even
though the commentators, toward the end of the video after a hit to center field, say of the girls,
“and nobody noticed!” The camera continually returns to the girls, checking and monitoring their
activity. It is suspected that they are more involved in their phones and themselves than in the
game.
There are, of course, multiple levels of misogyny on display, here. These women are
imaging themselves, voluntarily, utilizing their phone cameras to extend their view of
themselves; this competes with the way that the camera functions as an avatar of the male gaze.
The announcers use the camera to view these women imaging themselves, and then to accuse
them of narcissism and even stupidity. Though they are explicitly exhorted to take selfies, the
right to look at women’s bodies is afforded only to the camera as a proxy for the male
announcers and the male audience. In viewing themselves, these women are seen as
transgressing this dynamic.
This moment maps onto early 2010’s cultural commentary on selfies, which was
frequently related specifically to the practices of women on the internet. Narcissism is contrasted
to empowerment vis-à-vis women’s selfie taking practices. If the late 2000’s saw what Anders
Albrechtslund calls a ‘moral panic’ about privacy and information sharing on social media
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websites,144 the early to mid-2010’s saw a quite different moral panic about the value and
purpose of selfies, specifically concerning their relation to women’s display of their bodies and
the narcissism these practices indexed. As John Suler writes, commentators in the early 2010s,
“when very light-weight mobile phones included cameras with dual-view LCD screens,”145
complained that selfie making “was pure narcissism…an act of self-indulgence,”146 especially for
women who used “nude and provocative selfies [as] a powerful way to attract an online
audience, especially [when] seeking male attention.”147 This has meant, for some feminists like
feminist blog Jezebel’s Erin Gloria Ryan, selfies are “a high tech reflection of the fucked up way
society teaches women that their most important quality is their physical attractiveness.”148 For
her, selfies are always “calls for affirmation,”149 a kind of control through narcissism that
requires women to be on view for men, “a reflection of the warped way we teach girls to see
themselves as decorative.”150
Others view selfies rather more positively. Tiidenberg and Gómez-Cruz, for instance,
explore NSFW (Not Safe for Work) Tumblr blogs, examining how women who post nude selfies
to these blogs experience this ‘self-shooting’ as “a self-therapeutic and awareness-raising
practice. It has allowed for a new kind of body to emerge—a powerful, sexual, female body.”151
Minh-Ha T. Pham, alternatively, examines online feminist and undocumented Asian-American
activist projects that utilizes selfies and the composure of the fashionable female body in way
that networks vanity, allowing:
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the networked subject-as-represented object a hand in shaping and controlling their
representation. They make choices about when to take a selfie or fashion blog style outfit
photo; where to position the head, face, and body in relation to the camera […] when to
share it online or whether to share it at all.152
Selfies provide an experience of self-control—of a sense that one can manage one’s
image and its proliferation and dissemination. As Slate’s Rachel Simmons writes, selfies might
allow “girls [to] practice promoting themselves” by placing the control of camera—and its
ability to fashion one’s image—in the hands of girls.153
The video exhibits these contrasting ideas about selfies. Though it is not explicit from the
video that these women feel empowered through their selfie-taking, it is interesting to note that,
after the video went viral (the women were even featured on Ellen),154 the Arizona
Diamondbacks offered them free tickets to a future game, perhaps as a sort of apology; instead of
accepting the tickets, the women requested that they be donated to “families at A New Leaf, a
local [Arizona] non-profit that helps support victims of domestic violence.”155 Though this is not,
perhaps, an explicitly feminist gesture aimed at the patriarchal visualities that shamed their
selfie-taking practices, it does reveal that they used the virality of their collective image as a kind
of solidarity building, empowering practice, oriented toward a cause frequently identified with
feminism. This gesture is a direct attempt to contravene the accusations of narcissism and
stupidity hurled at the women during the viral clip, meaning that it also provides an example of a
nexus of these competing ideas about selfies.
What is interesting, however, is that narcissism and empowerment appear, both in the clip
and in the discourse about selfies, to emerge from different viewpoints that I contend develop
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from different relations to the emptied space. This is to the say that the same gestures look
different for those outside of emptied space (the announcers) in contrast with those within in it
(the sorority sisters). The women in the clip use their phones to take selfies at a baseball game,
reorganizing the space around them into an alternative space that is slightly outside of the
baseball stadium. For them, this space operates as a platform for building friendships, having
positive affective experiences, and, simply, having fun. Rather than, as Sherry Turkle says,
“making it hard to settle into serious conversations with ourselves and with other people because
emotionally, we keep ourselves available to be taken away from everything,”156 selfies here—and
more specifically, the common space that selfie arm actuates—allow these women to experience
being together in a different way and in a different space. Crucially, this is only indirectly related
to the baseball game itself. Not only could we imagine this scenario occurring in many different
physical places, the announcers are irritated that the women are not paying attention to the game
because they are not quite in the baseball arena any longer. When they say that “nobody noticed”
the hit to center field, their tone suggests that if these women are attending a baseball game, they
should pay attention to the game.157 They are “locked into” their phones—the announcers see
them as isolated, narcissistic individuals, who are oblivious to their surroundings. What they do
not comprehend, in spite of clear signs of joy and fun on the part of the women, is that they are
not experiencing the game as isolated individuals. They are, rather, transported into the emptied
space, which allows them to build intimacy amongst themselves. In embodying rhetorics of
dematerialization through gestures on and with iPhone, in using selfie arm and reducing the
distance between them and their phones, they utilize the spatializing capabilities of their own
bodies to transform proximal space into the emptied space, remaining both inside and outside of
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their physical surroundings. By tactically reappropriating the space given to them by iPhone, the
women can creatively self-compose both themselves as individuals and as a group; even if this
creative self-composure represents the strategized tactics of the emptied space, their performance
has actual effects that are not all negative.
Texting while Driving: Distraction
Campaigns against texting while driving similarly display the operations of the emptied
space, though in this case, the ramifications of existence in that space can be rather more
negative. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSFA) has, since around
2010, been producing short videos aimed at reducing texting while driving; these videos
emphasize the potential tragedy that this sort of distraction may. Generally, these videos depict
teenagers (though some videos picture adults) laughing in cars with their friend. The driver gets a
text or wants to check their phone for some reason, and just at that moment, the car is totaled in
some disastrous highway accident. “OMG!,” a video from 2010, follows this trend. 30 seconds
long, OMG! follows three separate groups of teenagers, all within similar tragic narratives. One
driver wants to “text Allison,” another calls a friend with news that he has “got the food and
we’re on our way right now,” while the third is shown texting. The passengers in the cars all are
laughing, as if they are having a lot of fun—they seem carefree, young, and happy. In two of the
three scenarios, the driver looks up to see an unknown obstacle and cannot stop in time to
prevent an accident. The third has the teenagers’ car hit from the side. In all three, we see
dramatic images of bits of metal and clouds of smoke; we hear tires squealing and loud crashes.
The camera zooms out and, to emphasize the danger of texting while driving, the obstacles
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struck by the cars turn out to be giant, metallic looking instance of text speak: L8R, LOL, and
OMG (figure 12). The cars are stopped, crumpled against the letters; in one, we can see the
blonde hair of a teenage girl hanging
out of a passenger side window.
Here, the emptied space takes
drivers out of real space to
distracted, disastrous effect.158 The
implied physical existence of text
speak—it ability to function as a

Figure 12

physical threat—underlines how performing iPhone actualizes emptied space. It is not simply
that texting while driving distracts drivers who then cause or are in traffic accidents: it is that the
communicative functions of the emptied space become actual dangers when they are performed.
The emptied space both distracts and threatens not because it provides distracting functions to
the driver, but because it changes the qualitative experience of space itself. Distraction occurs
when the user steps out of real space into the emptied space.
In this case, the emptied space appears somewhat like Gary Backhaus’s ‘telephonic
space.’ Gary Backhaus suggests that telephonic space can constitute a ‘we-relationship’ between
two telephone conversationalists that allows for the asymmetrical completion of joint projects
through a transcendent telephonic space. If I am cooking, for instance, and I call a friend for
help, we share a project that 1) is shared only through a telephonic space that is transcendent in
relation to either of our physical locations, 2) allows for the completion of the project directly by
me through the use of my friend as a source of knowledge about the recipe, and 3) allows for the
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completion of project indirectly by my friend vicariously through me. She tells me that I have to
cook the food for such and such time—I do this, completing the project only through our shared
telephonic space.159 Most saliently for my purposes, this means that “the telephone as a substitute
for other forms of interaction qualitatively alters the very nature of the experience of
environmental space.”160 Use of the telephone and entering telephonic space allows me to
experience proximal space differently: I gather information about cooking through telephonic
space and, as a result, I experience the kitchen differently i.e. I know more about it and develop a
different relationship to it. Telephonic space is at work in “OMG!,” considering that only one of
the phones in the video is a touchscreen smartphone, and especially that one of the distractions,
here, is actually a phone call that exhibits a project shared in telephonic space. One of the drivers
appears to have picked up food for friends at another location, and is now bringing that food
back. In each case, though, the qualitative experience of proximal space shifts quite dramatically,
causing them to forget actual space and get into car accidents.
The emptied space, however, differs from telephonic space in at least one important
respect, though emptied space does rely on and in some cases extends telephonic space. First, to
be actualized, it does not need multiple people in conversation—indeed, it does not require
conversation at all. Instead, it merely requires use of iPhone. We might say that, because iPhone
functions as a fetish—because it appears as if a friend and interlocuter—it stands in for the
person on the other end of a phone call, even if iPhone does activate telephonic space (it is, after
all, a phone). All it requires is touch—it just works. We might also think, specifically, of how
iPhone can operate as a mobile gaming device, which is to say that we do not have to be talking
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to someone else to be distracted while driving. The emptied space, perhaps, can provide social
functions without any necessary connection to a social world, or, it at least can distract without
anyone being the distractor. This also means that emptied space, unlike telephonic space, does
not need a shared project to be actualized; instead, it is activated merely in performance, mere
use. Where telephonic space requires a sense of intention—you are on the phone to do something
other than talk on the phone—emptied space does not. It is not surprising, then, that another
video, called “Emoji 30,”161 visualizes the distracted driver as one who is only nominally doing
something on the phone. This video tells the story of a teenage girl whose boyfriend dies because
of an accident caused by her own distracted driving. Her face is replaced by emoji, cartoon
versions of various emotional states that crudely signify her feelings concerning the accident.
When the narrative flashes back in time to the moment of the accident, we see that she had been
idly scrolling through emoji at the time of the accident. Though it could be presumed that she
was attempting to insert a relevant emoji into a text message, the video does not specify her
purpose, framing her use of her phone as a kind of idle, aimless activity. By eliminating any
reference to her reasons for using her phone at that moment, “Emoji 30” imagines use of iPhone
as purposeless—as, that is, pure distraction. Telephonic space requires that interlocuters focus on
a shared purpose; emptied space requires that a user is idly distracted by iPhone.
But even though the emptied space, in the context of distracted driving, has demonstrably
negative effects, these effects—and their encapsulation under the label ‘distraction’—still appear
only for those outside the emptied space. For those within it, it functions as an interactive,
connective space. Another video produced by NHTSFA, called “Liz Marks: Texting and Driving
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Story,” suggests this.162 This video tells the story of Liz Marks, 20 years old as of the video’s
filming in 2014, who, after receiving a text from her mother, crashed her car. This accident had
multiple permanent effects. She says:
I am blind in one eye now; I cannot smell; I cannot hear [very well] because a bone
broke in half and cut my ear drum; I can’t create tears because both my tear ducts got
damaged, and I can’t put my body to sleep naturally. I take medicine to go to sleep.163
The video juxtaposes her condition after the accident with her condition before it,
constructing a before and after narrative focused around the condition of her body. Before, she is
“preppy,” models occasionally, and has multiple friends and a vibrant social life. After, she has
scars over her left eye and on her neck. Her mother is immediately horrified at her condition. She
says: “I was getting ready for work and then 12 hours later I’m in ICU staring at my daughter,
who’s bald and [has] tubes running in and out of her body and it’s just overwhelming
devastation.”164 Liz has become monstrous and disfigured. Her body has been violently
reconstructed, and now serves as a symbol to warn against the (very real) dangers of distracted
driving. In a way, this narrative is a perverse version of the narratives of makeover TV. As
Brenda Weber describes, makeover TV narratives operate as a “form of shame-induced
governmentality,”165 that requires ‘ugly’ subjects to submit to aggressive humiliation before they
can be reconstructed as citizens that are normative, beautiful, and good. Juxtaposition of the ugly
Before and the beautiful After allows “the After to highlight the dreadfulness of the Before.”166
Women whose Before bodies were not-quite-feminine enough and, thus, shamed and shameful,
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are remade as approximating the ‘ideal’ woman, shaped (sometimes literally—and violently) into
the apex of white American femininity.
Liz’s story operates according to a perverse version of this narrative logic. As with
makeover TV, Before- and After-bodies are shown next to each other, as if to emphasize the
transformation, and as with makeover TV, Liz’s transformation leads to a reconstructed
citizenship—in this case, a normative acceptance of the dangers of distracted driving. But, in
contrast with makeover TV narratives, Liz’s body before represents the apex of American
teenage femininity—she is white, ‘preppy,’ and popular—while her After-body is that which is
framed as monstrous. Thus, rather than functioning as a “transformation […] of the subject’s
capacity to see and thus assert selfhood,”167 Liz’s perverse makeover—and especially her
reconstructed, monstrously framed body—functions as a disempowered symbol that warns
audiences about the dangers of distracted driving. Rather than granting a sense of subjectivity,
however tied to controlling norms of beauty and femininity, the perverse makeover reconstructs
Liz’s body into a powerless symbol that functions purely as part of dominant discourse about
distracted driving.
However, what is crucial is Liz’s reasoning for her distracted driving. Though she seems
to have been aware of the way that the emptied space manifests as distraction, her insider
position in relation to the space urged her to “ignore those warnings about texting while driving,”
privileging the emptied space’s social functions over its potential harmful effects. In fact, Liz
says, “I used my cell phone every second, every minute, every hour. Like, if I didn’t have it I
would freak out because I couldn’t connect with my friends, I couldn’t connect with anyone. I
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couldn’t connect with social media or anything. If I didn’t have my cell phone I felt lonely.”168
The emptied space, as with the video of the selfie talking sorority sisters, allows those within it
to build friendships and connect socially, though in this case the emptied space more closely
approximates telephonic space. It also, however, stages the fetishistic relation that Liz has with
her phone—not being able to connect with friends is elided into not being able to connect with
anyone, this transforms into not being able to connect with social media, and this, finally, allows
Liz to say that without her phone, she would be lonely. This succession of phrases seems to stage
the phone as a friend who grants access to a rich world of social connection. A fear of loneliness
predicates the fear of being without a phone (nomophobia, as in the introduction), and both fears
revolve around entry into the emptied space. Fears and desire for social connection privilege
entry into the emptied space over driving. What appears as distraction to outsiders, functions as
thick social webbing for insiders.
MyFitnessPal: Information, Self-Management, and Datafication
Previous examples have underscored differing attitudes toward the emptied space: 1) an
emic perspective in which the emptied space functions—through gesture—to connect people
socially, both through iPhone’s social media capabilities and the common gestures that enact the
emptied space and 2) and etic perspective that understands the emptied space as individual
instances of narcissism, self-involvement, or distraction. Though the etic perspective does
accurately view the emptied space’s primary effect—the direct virtualization of the user’s
proximal space—it does not understand the space spatially; instead, the emptied space’s effects
are pinned to individuals (or groups) as negative characteristics. Additionally, the etic
perspective on the emptied space is, generally, dominant. The effects of the emptied space, thus,
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circulate and, in part, constitute and re-constitute larger cultural discourses. In the first case, the
etic perspective reproduces archaic ideas connecting women and narcissism and the function of
the male gaze to (solely) determine the meanings of the female body. In the second case, we
might say that the etic perspective is a primary force in the constitution of the discourse pinning
extreme social disconnection, narcissism, and distraction on young people. Though a counternarrative has recently emerged, so-called ‘millennials’ are often blamed for most or many of the
US’s social problems. This is often explicitly related to their use of social media and touchscreen
smartphones. For example, NPR, in summarizing findings supposedly revealing that “millennials
are simply more narcissistic than previous generations,”169 suggest that an obsession with the
self—and an overvaluing of one’s own talents and abilities—might lead “the rude awakening
many millennials face in their twenties when their high expectations don’t match reality.”170
Interestingly, this article specifically references usage of social media and touchscreen
smartphones, directly linking to an article about “how Millennials use and control social
media.”171 While this thesis does not directly consider social media, social media—especially
after the advent of iPhone—is, currently, deeply intertwined with usage of touchscreen
smartphones. Social media and the emptied space work together to deepen the distinction
between etic and emic perspectives on social media. But though the emptied space manifests in
performing iPhone, its continued production—and the ways it is filled in by culture more
generally—becomes a joint project between both perspectives.
This means that every actualization of the emptied space is both user performed through
gesture on and with iPhone and part of larger cultural genealogies that attempt to imprint on the
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emptied space after the moment of its actualization. In other words, the etic perspective attempts
to do through pure observation what the emic perspective does through embodied performance—
namely, constitute and complete the emptied space as well as the subjects who perform (inside)
it. But if the previous sections examine how these discourses are applied after the performance of
emptied space to discipline the space into more closely resembling proximal space, insofar as
proximal space is saturated with the discourses that perspective attempts to apply, this section
examines an instance in which these discourses—and the genealogies they embody—come to
partially constitute the emptied space in the moment of its performative manifestation. This final
section examines the fitness app MyFitnessPal in order to describe how the emptied space can be
constituted by the etic perspective by ordering the gestures through which the emptied space is
performed. Rather than disciplining user’s tactical reappropriation of the emptied space, here I
examine how iPhone, through the emptied space, utilizes the provisions of tactics in its
strategy—how it strategizes tactics.
MyFitnessPal’s main website describes it as, primarily, a calorie counter app. Basically,
the app allows its user to search for foods he or she has eaten, and if the food is in
MyFitnessPal’s database, which has “over 5,000,000 food items,”172 it can be entered into the
user’s ‘diary.’ After it is entered into the diary, it is translated into numbers—calories, nutrients,
fats, fiber, protein—which allows the user to monitor and track his or her body in a way that is
expected to lead to weight loss. “Lose weight the healthy way,”173 the website exclaims. All you
must do is “simply keep track of the foods you eat,”174 which, curiously, removes the material
effort of weight loss from its own scene. Technologized weight loss becomes immaterial, that is,
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when the performance of tracking what enters the body takes precedence over the embodied
actions that might materially lead to weight loss (eating, working out, etc.).
In conjunction with the app’s focus on weight loss—on getting ‘into shape’—selftracking through technology becomes a form of (moral, physical, and psychological) self-control
over the body’s weight, shape, and size; at the same time that self-control is enacted, however, it
and the body that enacts it are rendered curiously immaterial, a purely numerical visual nexus.
Alexander Galloway’s distinction between data and information is useful, here. He writes, “The
Latin data…means literally “the things having been given.” Or in short form one might render
the term more elegantly as ‘the givens.”175 The world gives data as empirical traces—as
ontological ‘substance.’176 For Galloway, this means that data “have no necessary visual form,”177
or, that visualizations of data do not proceed logically from the data themselves, which is to say
that to visualize data is always to introduce an exterior order in the data. Instead, visualizations
of data are primarily visualizations of the rules for visualization—a graph of my body weight
over time first visualizes the axes on which data is graphed, and only after visualizes my body’s
data as a jagged line on that graph. Information, on the other hand, “stresses less a sense of
presence and giving-forth, and more a plastic adoption of shape,”178 so if data relates to the
philosophical conception of substance, information relates to the philosophical conception of
form. Information is in-formed data, data that has been given form, ordered and structured. If
data opens onto the ontological, information opens onto the aesthetic. Even if “data has no
necessary information,”179 information will, in this conception always be the aestheticization
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(visualization) of ontological data. Though it does not follow from data’s status as pre-visual that
data opens onto an ontic realm of pure objective truth, the idea that there is a gap between data
and information is useful for my analysis. Data, in becoming information, is on view, and with
iPhone, able to be touched and directly manipulated. Data gathered and tracked by MyFitnessPal
is related contextually only to the disembodied act of tracking rather than the embodied actions
from which the data is gathered and because performing self-control through technological selftracking, in this case, hails the human user as an immaterially informational being—a being
whose embodiment is only the data gathered by the app and presented back to the user as
information. Even if “nondigital [i.e. material] methods are still used by many people…who
self-track for monitoring and recording aspects of their lives;”180 even as “self-tracking [writ
large] is not simply about quantified (or quantifiable) information;”181 and even though many
scholars have questioned and are questioning the presumed immateriality of information on
bodily or infrastructural grounds,182 MyFitnessPal emphasizes immateriality over materiality,
because it operates as a site for the application of rhetorics of dematerialization. Device and user
hover as information within the emptied space, ironically dematerialized only because of
embodied (and material) performance. Both must answer to the challenge of what Jon McKenzie
calls technological performance: effectiveness:
The performance of a technology refers to its technical effectiveness in a specific
application or set of applications undertaken in a particular context…Performance [in
these contexts] means effectiveness, an effectiveness that, in most cases, must be
quantified for measurement and endlessly qualified for evaluation.183

180

Lupton, The Quantified Self, 29.
Ibid.
182 e.g. Starosielski, “Warning”; Hayles, How We Became Posthuman; Galloway and Thacker, The Exploit; French, “Gaps in the
Gaze.”
183 McKenzie, Perform or Else, 97.
181

93

Human users become “high performance technologies,” exhibiting specific “behaviors
and properties…while executing specific tasks in specific contexts.”184 Eating, exercising, and
even walking are performed in specific, controlled ways, quantified as data, then presented as
visualized information, and consistently evaluated by the user herself, which also makes the user
more transparent and available to outside monitoring. MyFitnessPal’s data-based self-tracking
reformats the human body as a self-monitoring machine, required to perform effectively. That
this performance is regulated by the creation of an entire world around the user—the
accumulation of water bottles, healthy foods, cookbooks, running shows, and gym
memberships—emphasizes how the continued performance of attachment to iPhone can be
modulated into both the manifestation and filling of emptied space. Additionally, as I will show
in the second part of my analysis, even the performance of the space of the fitness app is
negotiated between etic and emic perspectives on the emptied space: users of MyFitnessPal bring
the space into being, and then subsequently fill it in with their new, fit selves’ detritus, but, here,
the manifesting performance of emptied space is itself constituted by cultural conceptions of
both what an ideal (feminine) body is, should do, and should look like and the value and usage of
personal information
My analysis will, first, briefly sketch out MyFitnessPal’s layout and interface,
emphasizing how it requires the performance of self-control through both the input and gathering
of information about the user’s body and how this networks embodiment, constituting it as a
relation between the user and her information double (i.e. the graphs.) Secondly, I will turn to a
clip from the TODAY show that tells a story about a young woman who used MyFitnessPal to
lose weight. Implicitly moral in tone (it is ‘good’ that she lost weight), the clip sublates the

184

Ibid., 130.

94

woman’s story to the larger narrative of the clip. I will suggest that this clip underlines the
datafication of the user’s body by making ambiguous the distinction between self-tracking, selfcontrol, and self-evaluation and tracking, control, and evaluation of individuals from without.
Inputting Information, Gathering Data
Figure 13, a screenshot from the author’s iPhone, images MyFitnessPal’s basic interface.
After the user inputs basic information about her body—height,
weight, age and biological sex—she is asked about her fitness
goals. These are rather narrowly defined in terms of weight loss
goals. Users can input what their ‘target weight’ is; how fast they
would like to lose this weight, in pounds per week; their activity
level, on a four-position scale ranging from ‘not very active’ to
‘very active;’ and their daily calorie goal. If the user does not
specify a daily calorie goal the app decides what this goal should
be, based on the available information about the user’s body,
Figure 13: MyFitnessPal’s interface.
Screenshot from the author’s iPhone.

fitness goals, and activity levels. This calorie goal appears on the
main interface as the first term in a simple equation: calorie goal

minus food plus exercise equals remaining calories. Simply, calories, here, are placed into a
gamified bodily economy in which one has limited ‘funds.’ By eating, a user expends funds, but
through exercise a user can earn funds. ‘Remaining calories,’ the result of this equation, is a
running score that is updated throughout the day as the user eats and exercises. Of course, as
figure 1 shows, MyFitnessPal has the capability to track things other than added and subtracted
calories, including water and grams/percent daily values of nutrients ingested from foods eaten.
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However, calories remain the most important things tracked by MyFitnessPal, as well as,
crucially, the only item that can be tracked without direct input; by linking with the pedometer
function on many modern touchscreen smartphones, MyFitnessPal can track users’ steps and
other daily movement and automatically add these steps to the exercise portion of users’ diaries
and translate these steps to estimated calories burnt providing ‘extra’ funds for the main calorie
counting equation. Here, we might say that MyFitnessPal primarily relies on a passive
datafication because it is consistently pinned to sensors that automatically gather data about the
user’s activity, and automatically visualizes that data as information that you can then
manipulate. iPhone’s ability to function as a sensor and to the “forms of pervasive, always-on
passive” data gathering that this allow, 185provides a subliminal datafication of the body through
the automatic capture of, here specifically, number of steps taken per day.
Though the interface is largely based on direct user input, the automatic addition of
‘extra’ calories provides an incentive for the user to input data when they otherwise may not
have. Perhaps accidentally, the presentation of automatically gathered and generated data
becomes a rhetorical technique that subliminally attempts to persuade users to input more often
and to become more involved with the app. It is not unhelpful that calories burnt through
everyday movement are framed as ‘extra’ or ‘bonus.’ You have won a prize, already, so why not
try for more? Immersion is created through the automatic gathering of information about the
body, but it is performed through direct input by the user. Active datafication, or datafication
based on active input of data into the device is, here, predicated by passive datafication—passive
data gathering makes it easy to convince the user to in the future actively input larger quantities
and types of data. Active data input is, in the experience of the app, sublimated to passive data
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gathering; the app’s interface attempts to make active data input habitual, automatic, and, thus,
more passive. As Wendy Hui Kyong Chun suggests, “through habits users become their
machines,”186 which suggests that as data input becomes habitual, it becomes more like the
passive data gathering performed by iPhone. Immersion occurs when these dissimilar processes
converge in one technological performance. Within this performed immersion, embodiment is
dematerialized, or, made virtual. As Diana Taylor writes, “digital platforms create their own
experiential environments,” environments that:
prompt the need and desire for embodiment, even if that embodiment is simulated or
virtual…Experiencing, once again, becomes a privileged way of knowing. But
experience can no longer be limited to living bodies understood as pulsing biological
organisms. Embodiment, understood as the politics, awareness, and strategies of living in
one’s body, can be distanced from the physical body…We are or have avatars in virtual
environments. We have data doubles, our very own powerful digital other composed of
bits and pieces of information.187
MyFitnessPal and apps like it provoke just this desire for embodiment through immersion
in an informational environment or articulation to an informational milieu. By providing new
‘strategies of living in one’s body’ through various fitness techniques, MyFitnessPal extends
embodiment. This requires performing input which extends and helps to reproduce the milieu
that provokes it. By performing input, the user’s embodiment becomes, like the milieu to which
she is articulated, virtual data. At the same time, this virtual body requires the physical body for
the data that comprises it. Embodiment exists somewhere between the phone and me. My
physical body becomes virtualized as data and visualized as information, though never just once.
Instead, virtualization becomes both a series of disconnected instances (input) and a continuous
stream (gathering), though the former, through habit, begins to merge with the latter. This
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parallels how Tobias Matzner describes how Big Data allows for “the decoupling of data
generation and analysis:”188
Many methods related to Big Data try to tie in all kinds of sources that might be useful
for the desired outcome. This can be data that has been generated at different times,
different places, and in different contexts compared to where the analysis takes place.
Consequently, a rule of thumb to store all available data has emerged, since it might be
useful in the future…Concerning surveillance, this leads to a phenomenon which could
be called ‘prospective surveillance:” huge databases that are just stored for the time
being—but with the possibility to be used for purposes of surveillance at any time in the
future.189
It is not until these databases are analyzed that the data within
them becomes correlated together and understood as a pattern, or, as
information. My suggestion is that the data collected by
MyFitnessPal—whether through input or gathering—constitutes
something like a database that is visualized as a temporal aggregate of
the user’s body. Past activity levels, past meals, past calories and
nutrients are instantiated as individual points and then presented to
the user in a conveniently legible manner. The body becomes a graph
(figure 14). Its history collapses into one virtual image, always under

Figure 14: Progress. Screenshot
from the author’s iPhone.

the label of ‘progress.’ Ironically, this progress visually implies and
relies on the anti-progressive; instead of pointing toward the careful curation and continued
existence of the user’s body, the conventions of data visualization in MyFitnessPal are a direct
manifestation of the rhetorics of dematerialization. Even though the graph is the body in a
directly referential sense, its representation conventions suggest that at some point that body will
disappear. To become thin is to make progress, which is also to tend toward zero. This zero is the
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subliminal telos manifested by MyFitnessPal’s data visualization, shepherding users toward
progress, even as this progress relies on the body’s future existence.
Even so, embodiment is managed as a relation between this graph—the data double—and
the physical body, which becomes, above all, a source of data. The graph, as an aggregate,
appears to reflect how the user’s body ‘actually is.’ Because quantified and static, it appears as if
more trustworthy, predictable, reliable, and rational than the user’s moment to moment
experience of her body, especially since that moment to moment experience is, when using the
app, always articulated to the graph. José van Dijck, describing Big Data’s surveillance of people
online, calls this ‘dataism.’ Its most important quality is “a belief in the objectivity of
quantification,”190 and of the automatic truthfulness of that quantified data. Dataism supposes
that data always tells the truth; because it presumes objective accuracy, dataism imagines data as
pure given—raw and unprocessed. Considered in this way, Galloway provides crucial
philosophical support for dataism by asserting that data opens onto a quasi-mystical ontic realm
that exists before measurement. This is not to say that data has no claim on some kind of truth;
instead, I am underlining that data “need to be imagined as data to exist and function as such,
and the imagination of data entails an interpretive base.”191 Data analysis clearly underlines this.
As Sara Degli Esposti writes, analysis occurs within a set of “performative expectations [that]
indicate sets of assumptions, or even theories, explaining the relationship between individual’s
prospective and desired behavior.”192 These expectations define and describe what data gathered
comes to mean by structuring its analysis. This explanatory structure is what allows analysts to
interpret individuals’ present behavior and guide their future behavior. But these expectations
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also direct data gathering by providing a framework in which data about only certain kinds of
behavior are gathered: “Most applications of Big Data are developed, marketed, and used on the
premise that the data represent a certain aspect of the world in computable form.”193 To gather
data is to gather data about specific aspects of the world or human behavior, aspects that are
defined in advance of the gathering, meaning that the data is already defined as something other
than purely ontological. Vis-à-vis MyFitnessPal, because of a dataist conception of the
ontological verity of data and the authority of quantification, we are primed to accept numerical
conceptions of embodiment as more accurate than the everyday, lived experience of
embodiment. We are willing to submit to the authority of the data picture, as if the process of
data visualization authorizes the ‘raw’ data as raw and, therefore, unquestionable.
Here, the emptied space functions as if to make the user the data analyst—by presenting a
database available to the user’s direct manipulation, her deep touch (chapter 1). It appears as if
the user controls this information, both through the direct input of data and through the ability to
touch, swipe, and zoom on this most intimate portrait of the body as perfectly transparent. At the
same time, the emptied space itself orders the conventions of data visualization themselves,
meaning that any information that is manipulated by the user is always-already conceived within
in parameters set by the app, parameters that become invisible even as the visualization
embodies them. In figure 2, the axes of body weight and time (in the form of dates in which I
logged my weight), nearly disappear. In fact, the axes themselves, as physical lines are
completely gone, while the numbers that index the existence of those axes are in a thin, grey
typeface. By contrast, the line representing the aggregate of my body weight over time is orange,
and the number representing my current weight stands out in white against this orange color.
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Meanwhile, the only other colors in the image (other than the ad, asking “What’s your metabolic
age?) are the dull blue of the interface and the cheery green of the downward pointing arrow next
to my change in weight. The graphed body double appears friendly and inviting as opposed to
the nearly invisible numbers that structure it. The conventions of data visualization, here,
produce the dematerialization of the body—its becoming thin—a productive impulse, while
concealing the fact that this ‘progress,’ and gestures of self-control that it implies, are ordered by
conventions of visualization that disappear in the process of visualization. What’s more, the
emptied space actually appears in the visualization—the graph itself foregrounded against both
lines implying invisible axes and white space, which I would suggest is more-thanmetaphorically connected to the emptied space. By emphasizing the graph as a colorful, inviting
picture of the body over the graph as a set of purposefully ordered numbers, the graphed body
double can 1) appear as if an authoritative friend who helps through the process of weight loss
while 2) relying on the unstated premise of dataism—that observable numbers are more
authoritative than lived experience.
Crucially, however, because the presentation of the graphed body double relies on the
performance of the real body, embodiment is reconfigured as a networked relation between real
body and the graphed body double. This relation is a disciplinary relation in which networked
embodiment through the presentation of the graphed body double provides the substrate for the
human user’s subliminal introjection of technological performance’s challenge of effectiveness.
Because her sense of embodiment is detached from her physical body and because it is managed
or mediated by the app, the user’s bodily experience becomes technologized as information that
is visible and manipulable to the user. This visualization and potential manipulability means that
using the app necessarily involves her in the evaluation and maintenance of herself. She
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evaluates her eating and her exercise in order to maintain the shape of her body’s graph, and this
maintenance involves her performing effectively in any context. Emptied space functions as the
scene that contextualizes this performance, here constituted by both its emic performance as selfcontrol and its etic surveillance as exterior control. Crucially, as I show in the next section,
because of the genealogies involved—Weight Watchers, personal trainers, makeover experts,
dieticians, etc. — the app and the data double that emerges in and as the graph are in a position
of power relative the user. The user submits to the app because the app automates older versions
of fitness disciplinarians. At the same time, this data double doubly doubles as an application of
Haggerty and Ericson’s surveillant assemblage:
We are witnessing a convergence of what were once discrete surveillance systems […]
This assemblage operates by abstracting human bodies from their territorial settings and
separating them into a series of discrete flows. These flows are then reassembled into
distinct ‘data doubles’ which can be scrutinized and targeted for intervention.194
The emptied space abstracts users from their everyday circumstances and considered only
in terms of activity level, made modifiable through its presentation as information. The emptied
space is, then, doubly constituted by strategized tactics. First, MyFitnessPal formulates the space
as the stage for the technologization of disciplinary fitness technicians. Second, MyFitnessPal
reveals one way in which the emptied space more generally functions as a personalized version
of what many have called “dataveillance,” which is, at its simplest, the surveillance of
individuals or populations through the collection and analysis of data gathered by information
technology systems.
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Effectiveness and Evaluation
Self-control through and as technology vis-à-vis MyFitnessPal is formulated as an
internalized requirement to constantly monitor and evaluate the self. This is predicated by the
app’s management of embodiment as a technological relation that exists neither within the app
nor as the user’s physical body but, instead, between the physical body imagined as only ever a
source of data and this data’s virtual aggregation—the creation of informational graphs that
comprise the user’s virtual body double. The user evaluates this relation, and then controls what
she is eating or how much exercise she is doing in order to more closely align the physical body
with the goals that her virtual body—acting as a disciplinarian—urges her toward. This tends
toward immateriality: the virtual body is a body of ‘progress’ toward lower and lower weights
which means that extended to its limit, the body would disappear. The most effective body is one
that is data and, hence, purely transparent, weightless, and manipulable.
However, because 1) embodiment is made relational and consistently multinodal, 2) this
relational embodiment is articulated to an interiorized challenge of effectiveness, and 3) the
emptied space is constituted by both emic gesture and etic surveillance, self-control over the
body through performing iPhone blurs into (or becomes seamless with) exterior control. This
section will utilize a clip from TODAY’s Joy Fit Club segment to show this, focusing
specifically on the way that clip constructs its narrative and on two ‘mirror moments’ in which
the body is confronted with its double.
The Joy Fit Club is a segment on TODAY, hosted by the always effervescent Hoda Kotb
and Kathie Lee Griffin, in which Joy Bauer, a dietician and “one of the [self-proclaimed]
nation’s leading health authorities,”195 shares “inspirational weight loss success stories from
195
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members” of the club,196 as well as health, diet, and fitness tips. These stories are paired,
generally, with the introduction of the story’s subject.
In March of 2014, a young woman named Brittany Bush was featured in a segment
about two people, who as Kathie Lee Griffin said, “both lost nearly half their body weight…the
old-fashioned way, everybody: through diet and exercise.”197 This insistence on these individuals
losing weight “the old-fashioned way” is curious in Brittany’s case because it is made clear that
her extreme weight loss was facilitated by MyFitnessPal.198 Her use of the app is sublimated to
“the old-fashioned way:” diet and exercise, pure self-discipline and self-control. This underlines
how the app contributes to the networking of the user’s experience of embodiment. The app
disappears as an external measure of self, instead becoming integrated into the body schema as
an internal regulatory device. Nevertheless, that the app is differentially embodied—that it
remains formally within a device that is only incorporated into the user during the moment of
use—has two effects that I will describe through my analysis of this short clip. First, it structures
the experience of embodiment as consistently mirrored, including both discrete events of
recognition of the self in the mirror and the continuous mirroring effected by the virtual body
created by MyFitnessPal. Second, this diffusion of embodiment into multiple nodes—networked
embodiment—creates a space into which external control can enter the scene of embodiment
itself.
Mirroring explicitly structures how the clip narrativizes Brittany. Joy describes her as
understanding herself as literally being “born with a preoccupation for food.”199 Both Brittany
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and Joy appear to consider body size essentially, that is, as an unchangeable and a priori facet of
embodiment. Thus, Brittany is not ‘much smaller:’ she is instead “half her size.”200 Her body is
only ever truly one size, and all variations of her body must be necessarily related to that one
size. This essentialism presumes that the body image mirrored would be immediately
recognizable to that body. However, the clip makes this somewhat more complicated by
contrasting two ‘mirror moments,’ one before weight loss and one after. In one sense, this clip
follows the conventional narrative of makeover TV, as opposed to its perverse version written of
above. Here, the juxtaposition of images of Brittany’s Before and After bodies functions to
shame the Before and glorify the After.201 Unsurprisingly, Brittany’s narrative begins with a
moment of intense shame. This is the typical ‘a-ha’ moment, we are told:
She was in her early twenties, she had peaked at 265 pounds. She was in the midst of a
stress eating episode and looked into the mirror and out loud said, “This. Is. Ridiculous. I
have to stop behaving like that.202
Brittany’s feeling echoes Susan Bordo’s comments on slenderness and the
pathologicization of eating vis-à-vis women’s bodies. She writes that “images of unwanted
bulges and erupting stomachs [operate] as a metaphor for anxiety about internal processes out of
control—uncontained desire, unrestrained hunger, uncontrolled impulse.”203 Britany is ‘out of
control,’ and appropriately, we here see images of her body, bulging—this is ‘ridiculous’ and
requires control. Peaking at a certain weight is implied as a moral and physical nadir, while
losing weight connotes progress and moral value. Immediately, Kathie Lee responds
appropriately, saying, moralistically, “Good for her.”204 Joy’s description of Brittany’s state
when she decided to lose weight emphasizes this, for she describes Brittany as degraded,
200
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humiliated, and out of control vis-à-vis her own body; she is at her largest, she is in the middle of
an eating that is pathologized, and as she looks into the mirror she both recognizes the image as
herself and disavows that image through aversion. Though she realizes that it is her image that
she sees she does not internalize that image as herself. Her mirror image is already enounced as
the shameful Before-body that must be replaced. She remains articulated to that Before—
recognition and identification—yet this size is at the same time displaced into a set of behaviors
that can be changed into the After-body. This is not simply a “repression of [a pathologized]
female hunger,”205 however. Instead, self-control enters the scene in this gap. As Bordo contends,
“power works also ‘from below,’ as women associate slenderness with self-management.”206
The essentially excessive female body becomes controllable, here, when its size is
exported to behaviors that can be controlled. MyFitnessPal can enter and reformulate
embodiment at this moment because it makes these behaviors visible and manipulable by
graphing them—self-management to slenderness is effected through the manipulability of the
graphed virtual body, the aggregation of behavior through time. The creation of this virtual body
is, however, necessarily reliant on processes of mirroring through which the user can recognize
herself. Brittany, that is, does not download MyFitnessPal until after she recognizes and
disavows her Before-body, until she projects the image of an After-body to which she can work.
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Curiously, the juxtaposition of Before and After-bodies, and the valuing of the latter over
and against the former, is suggested by
the layout of the Joy Fit Club Set and
Brittany’s entrance. When we are first
able to see the entire set (figure 15),
Hoda, Kathie Lee, and Joy are centered in
both the shot and the set, standing
Figure 15: the Joy Fit Club Set

between two tall, silver, wheeled tables
that have examples of the diets the two featured individuals in the segment used to lose weight.
Behind the three women are three physically disconnected screens. The center screen has the Joy
Fit Club logo on it, the right screen has a ‘before’ picture of Andrew, the other featured
individual, on it, while the left screen has Brittany’s before picture on it. In the picture, she looks
happy; smiling, her arms are outstretched, and she appears far removed from the image of the
degraded over-eater painted by Joy. Looking closely, legs are visible underneath the photo. They
are, of course, Brittany’s, as becomes evident when she is introduced. After Hoda shows the
audience her before picture, imploring them to “look at her,” Kathie Lee says, “step on out Brit!”
And Brittany does step on out, from behind her own before picture, spatially suggesting that this
‘new’ Brittany and the ‘old’ Brittany are the same person, that one Brittany hid the other. New
Brittany emerges from behind old Brittany, half the size. For Weber, what becomes significant in
moments like these is that the After-body is understood as the authentic self because it more
closely approximates societal norms and standards; this authentic self is glorified as empowering
because of its conformity. However, the individual performances that construct the After-body—
the work and measurement that bring it into being—“serve only to shift the woman’s place on
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the scale, not to eradicate the scale itself […and…] can only happen in the context of a
perception revolution that makes it clear that there are still heavier or more saggy women than
the transforming subject herself.”207 In this clip, these other “more saggy” women are represented
by the constant presence of the disavowed Before-body. Because of the intervention of
MyFitnessPal, however, the ‘scale,’ here, indexes more than either the physical device or the
metaphorical scale that measures women against other women. Brittany’s scale is almost entirely
herself: when she measures herself, it is less against the bodies of other women and more against
the overall body narrative that MyFitnessPal’s graphs represent. Every instance of self-control—
weighing the body, counting calories, measuring portions and proportions—becomes involved
with the ongoing project negotiated between the body as source for data and the graph as the
information body double. The emic performance that constitutes the emptied space, here, is
comprises of individual instances of self-control that discipline the body toward the emergence
of an empowered, affirmed After. This appears as a joint performance between the body double
and the real body, who together constitute and fill in the emptied space.
But this emic performance is, here, complicated by an etic observation that is built into
the device itself. Passive datafication, of course, invisibly submits the body to observation of
steps, but the app itself also functions as a technologization of fitness disciplinarians in such a
way that what seems like voluntaristic self-control can be ordered by exterior evaluation. For
Weber, makeover TV uses cruel ‘style experts’ to apply what she calls “affective domination,”
which “relies both on shaming and love-power to accomplish its transformations.”208 “Cruelty
disguised as humor” functions to shame the transforming body into submitting to the
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transformation,209 while the subsequent application of love-power encourages the transforming
body to continue transforming. Love-power, generally, is the modification of disciplinary
techniques from violent, corporal punishments into intimate, encouraging, and loving
practices.210 Affective domination is the passage from shaming to love-power: “shows [like What
Not to Wear] that begin with a premise of critique, shame, and objectification resolve with hugs
and praise.”211 Style agents on these TV shows begin as cruel disciplinarians, but end up gaining
“their social authority as an extension of the community of friends and family that instigated the
process of change in the first place [functioning] as a sort of super-friend-cum-therapist.”212
MyFitnessPal technologizes affective domination. Though it does not shame the user
directly, it does index a potential moment of shame—as Brittany’s story suggests, one does not
download MyFitnessPal until one is confronted with the shameful Before-body. In between this
moment and the emergence of the After-body, MyFitnessPal functions as the encouraging
trainer, sending users notifications reminding them to weigh themselves and offering diet and
exercise tips. This structures the performances of self-control that push the user toward the Afterbody and the emic constitution of emptied space—a new world is created around the user, as
long as your body fits. MyFitnessPal functions as the tough love trainer and as a part of the self,
thereby introjecting technological performance’s challenge of effectiveness. If makeover TV
relies on purely external evaluation to monitor the body’s progress toward the After-body,
MyFitnessPal allows the user, through networked embodiment, to be outside and inside the body,
allowing her to monitor herself. That the body is technologized is underlined, disturbingly, by
Brittany’s extreme regulation of her diet. She does not merely limit calories: she eats the same
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thing every single day. Her life appears perfectly regulated, and her body becomes extremely
effective. She has filled the emptied space with items that persist in spite of her mobility through
real space, voluntarily controlling herself with minute detail, even though this self-control only
exists because of the technologization of tough love physical trainers.
This means that the voluntary nature of this self-control is both contestable and unstable.
Brittany’s entrance stages another mirror moment that, again, allows Brittany to identify with her
mirror image while also distancing herself from it, while also underlining how self-control is
compromised by control. Hoda and Kathie Lee compare new Brittany with old Brittany and
perform disbelief. “No!” says Hoda. “Whose picture did you use?” says Kathie Lee. Here, the
performance of disbelief distinguishes between new and old Brittany as if they are different
people. Brittany incorporates both, however, in her response. As if to ‘convince’ Hoda and
Kathie Lee, she says “No, that’s me,” drawing out the vowels in each word. Others viewing her
against her mirror—the before image—insist that she is now a different person, but she, in order
to emphasize the behavioral self-control that allowed her to become ‘half her size,’ explicitly
identifies with that image. This mirror moment is, however, explicitly structured as a TV
makeover, complete with the intervention of a tough love trainer, Joy. Even though Brittany
completes her transformation alone and in the emptied space, etic observation continues to
constitute that space, allowing it to circulate within already existing regimes of visuality. The app
technologizes the trainer and allows for their internalization as a part of the user’s body and
behavior and this allows for that trainer’s reemergence as a physical, other body and the
appropriation of Brittany’s story as another instance of makeover TV.
These mirror moments are, thus, inverses of each other. If the first requires the moment
of identification before the fat body’s disavowal, the second places disavowal before
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identification. In both cases, though, disavowal and identification are inextricably linked and,
further, constitutive for control over a body specified as excessive. This control is instituted as
and in the gap introduced by mirroring the body. In the first case this is clearly self-control as
organized through technology, but in the second case this self-control is modified into control,
here, literalized as the placement and movement of Brittany’s body in the space of the TODAY
studio by people other than herself. She does not, that is, choose when to appear and when to
remain invisible, which metaphorically underlines the porousness between self-control and
exterior control as they are enacted through technology.
We might think of Richard Schechner’s famous description of performance as “twice
behaved behavior” or “restored behavior.”213 Here, “performance means: never for the first
time,”214 and this allows access to a subjunctive mood—an always future oriented ‘as if’—in
which “I am ‘beside myself,’ or ‘not myself…’ as if there were multiple me’s’ in each person.”215
It is clearly that self-control as enacted through and as technology is twice behaved. Brittany’s
story revealed this by showing how a double moment of identification and disavowal structures
any performance of self-control. Literally appearing within two moments, Brittany’s
technologized self-control is performed as versions of this double moment, that is, as twice
behaved. Further, between these explicit moments, MyFitnessPal intervened to allow Brittany to
perform self-control. Any use of the app necessitates identification with the virtual body
presented in it as well as disavowal of the physical body; this means that between the two mirror
moments narrated in the analyzed clip were a string of performances of self-control structured as
disavowal and identification. Finally, because these performances of self-control are necessarily
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mobile, considering the devices through which they are performed, they can be performed in any
context, meaning that they can be structured and restructured in radically different ways from
performance to performance. Self-control as the introjection of the challenge of technological
effectiveness becomes control when the self-evaluation mandated by it is contextually
restructured as exterior evaluation. Thus, if Brittany’s first mirror moment inaugurated selfevaluation through performances of self-control, the repetition of this performance in a context
like the TODAY show—highly and specifically structured, under another’s direction—directly
submits it to exterior evaluation.
Critically, both sorts of control are predicated by the practices of data gathering made
possible by iPhone and fitness apps. Passive datafication, here, promotes active participation in
the processes of one’s own embodiment through techniques of self-management. Corporate
practices of dataveillance, as developed and deployed through iPhone and fitness apps, appear to
rise to consciousness as the user’s manipulable, informational body double. Self-control appears
possible because figures like Brittany are presented as role models; self-control appears perfect
because the graphs that make it possible are manipulable and appear to make the body perfectly
transparent and known. The appearance of techniques of datafied self-control, however,
dematerializes the processes of sensored dataveillance that make it possible—it is not only you
who controls your embodiment, as the TODAY show clip so forcefully visualizes.
Among these three nodes, “the seemingly natural connection between the body and the
identity of the person reveals itself to be in perpetual slippage, a never-ending mirror stage of
development where identity never precisely occupies the body or vice versa.”216 It is not simply
that embodiment is networked between the body and its data double; these maintain a further
216

Gates, “Biometrics and Post-9/11 Technostalgia,” 38.

112

relation to exterior control through the dataveillance that makes technologized self-control
possible and that it hides. What’s more, this control maintains an ongoing and continuous split
between your body and its other self, the data double, its mirror image. MyFitnessPal and iPhone
appear to grant perfect self-control, but only on the condition that its user participates in a
doubling of herself, a doubling that allows for technological intervention on the embodiment that
obtains as the relation between the user and her data double. The data double—the informational
graph—is retroprojected as the condition for data gathering; the product of processing becoming
an ontological truth about the person through the performance of self-control offered by iPhone
and MyFitnessPal, even as the body and its double must remain distinct. Crucially, the emptied
space, as the manifestation of both emically performed dematerialization and etically observed
surveillance operates as the scene for the maintenance of this distinction and the ongoing
articulation of self-control and exterior control.
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Conclusion
The year of this writing will mark the tenth anniversary of iPhone’s introduction.
Stunningly, though, the advertising apparatus set in place a decade ago remains largely
unchanged. New versions of iPhone—no matter the banality of their updates—remain
‘revolutionary,’ new, and exciting. iPhone continues to be advertised as innovative, and, here,
innovation refers to a rhetorically constructed dematerialization that increases (or decreases?)
with each innovation. Each new version more closely approximates the ideal version of iPhone
projected and performed by rhetorics of dematerialization—they are thinner, brighter, better,
with fewer ports, and presumably, fewer problems. For example, iPhone 7 and 7 Plus, to which I
have updated recently, saw the largely bewildering elimination of the 3.5mm headphone jack,
even as its design and interior components received only minor modifications. Instead of wired
headphones, iPhone 7 is physically packaged with an adapter that permits their usage and
packaged in advertising with Apple branded wireless earbuds. Innovation equates to the
elimination of physical aspects of using iPhone—no more tangled wires! Rhetorics of
dematerialization present at the first introduction of iPhone continue to circulate, and perhaps
gather new and increased potency as they do so—and as they become unnoticeable features of
the topology of everyday life.
Coincidentally (or perhaps not) as iPhone has approached immateriality in design, it also
has become more deeply intertwined with its users’ everyday experiences. Apple Pay, for
example, attempts to replace individual credit and debit card payments with a simple touch to
iPhone’s fingerprint reading home button. All users must do is enter their bank account
information, and they will no longer have to carry around so many bothersome plastic cards.
Many of the artifacts I examine in this thesis also evidence the iPhone’s increasing embededness
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in our everyday lives. As I have argued, phenomena like fitness apps and selfies (and especially
selfie apps like Instagram and Snapchat) help to reorganize the experience of friendship,
proximal space, and even embodiment.
But, intriguingly, even this intertwining of iPhone and everyday life began with the
original iPhone—or was, at least, foreshadowed by the way it was talked about. At the keynote
introducing the original iPhone, Steve Jobs described its interface in a strikingly odd way. “We
don’t want to carry around a mouse,”217 he says, with an image of iPhone projected behind him.
“Oh! A stylus! We’ll use a stylus!”218 A stylus appears directly over the image of iPhone. But
Jobs responds flatly: “No. Who wants a stylus?”219 Apparently no one does: after describing the
tedium of using (and losing) styli, Jobs exclaims, “Yuck.” The stylus becomes more than simply
bothersome; it is actually disgusting. Unsurprisingly, Jobs’ response adheres to rhetorics of
dematerialization, but with a twist. The stylus certainly disappears and, ironically, some physical
“pointing device” must remain. Jobs suggests that “we’re going to use the best pointing device in
the world, a pointing device that we are all born with. We’re born with ten of them; we’re gonna
use our fingers.”220 If the stylus is dematerialized, then, it is replaced by our fingers, but,
conversely, our fingers disappear into a more general conception of the “pointing device.” A
double dematerialization, then, in which the technological device and the human user disappear
into each other. iPhone is deeply intertwined with everyday life from the beginning—interacting
with iPhone reconstitutes the human finger as a stylus. Even more intriguingly, though, this
technicization of the human capability of pointing is cast back as an essential characteristic of the
user. She is born with pointing devices—once technical, the finger was always technical.
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Formally, this is similar to Butler’s conception of gender performativity. Essentially,
conventional ideas about gender mean that “certain kinds of acts are usually interpreted as
expressive of a gender core or identity…based upon the perception of sex, where sex is
understood to be the discrete and factic datum of primary sexual characteristics.”221 Contra this
conception of gendered acts as expressive, Butler suggests that gendered acts are performative,
and constitute the illusion of an essential ‘gender core.’222 Performativity would then have the
secondary effect of theoretically casting this illusion back in time—each performative gender act
constitutes the illusion of an essential gender identity in the moment of performance, with the
illusion of essentiality providing a stable temporal past to an identity that is, basically, present
tense. Though unrelated to gender identity, Jobs’ revisioning of human fingers as pointing
devices establishes gesture on and with iPhone as similarly performative. Each gesture allows the
finger to function as a pointing device while also establishing an illusory, essential past for itself.
Thus, we are born with pointing devices already attached to us, even though finger-as-pointing
device can only be constituted in present performance with iPhone. This specific actualization of
performativity, however, operates in service of rhetorics of dematerialization that, in this
example, serve to allow the device and the user to disappear into each other (as I described in
chapter 1), dematerializing in the moment of use.
Device, User, Space
In the introduction, I suggest that the rhetorics of dematerialization circulate according to
three intersecting vectors. This final example serves as one way that we might imagine how
some of these intersections work in practice. In this section, I will briefly summarize how this
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thesis imagines how rhetorics of dematerialization operate on each vector, describe some
limitations of this thesis as well as avenues for future research, while also attempting to highlight
some of the more useful connections among the vectors.
First, vis-à-vis the device, rhetorics of dematerialization function to dematerialize the
device in the moment of use; at the same time, they project an immaterial version of the device
that mediates user attachment to it. This is fetishistic in effect because it works to both
interpellate a contradictory user that must both libidinally invest and disinvest in the same object
and because iPhone’s immaterial projection functions to defer this contradiction into the future,
temporarily resolving it in order to preserve capitalism’s metastability. Even so, these rhetorics
are foundationally ironic because even as they move the device toward immateriality, they must
also ensure the continued existence of the physical device so that touch, which primarily
generates the affective investment in the object and its projection, can continue to occur. Because
of this, new devices are continuously manufactured while the disposal of old devices functions
more like pure disappearance, at least in relation to the user’s direct experience.
But though this thesis suggests some broad connections between rhetorics of
dematerialization and questions of e-waste, ecological devastation, and the overlap between
iPhone’s spaces of production and spaces of disposal, it does not fully engage with these
questions, instead focusing merely on the ideological construction of iPhone’s user experience.
This is a major deficit because even though I want to suggest that rhetorics of dematerialization
are specifically ideological, it could be argued that my thesis operates purely within the
ideological field, meaning that I do not make any specific connections between the user
experience and its economic conditions of possibility. A more thoroughgoing engagement with
conceptions of ideology and literature on labor in the computer industry could have remedied
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this, and in the future it would be fruitful to explore these questions and link iPhone’s user
experience more specifically to how and where iPhone is produced and disposed of.
Additionally, my focus on the device and this device specifically was a way that I
attempted to limit the scope of this thesis. As the thesis progresses, however, I think it is
relatively clear that rhetorics of dematerialization and performances of attachment have much
more broad applicability than to simply iPhone or digital devices generally. This thesis could
have more specifically delimited the differences between how rhetorics of dematerialization
appear and function in relation to iPhone and how these might shift when applied to different
sorts of commodities.
Second, vis-à-vis the user, rhetorics of dematerialization function to reciprocally
dematerialize the human user, primarily as a mechanism of control through surveillance. If
iPhone’s user manual visualizes the human body as disembodied hands, put back together as a
new kind of tech-savvy subject through gesture-with iPhone, this process of subjectivation is
supplemented by processes of datafication actualized by some of iPhone’s features. The gestures
that articulate users to their iPhones—and the sort of brand magic that structures and defines
them—also presume the existence of a certain kind of informational user. This is a body that is
perfectly weightless and transparent, one that “no longer [has] any secrets or interiors”223 and is,
thus, radically open to exterior control.
However, one major deficiency of this thesis is that, though I describe what the body
hailed by iPhone’s rhetorics of dematerialization is, I neglect who it is. Though I describe how
the emptied space provides the scene for the user’s creative self-composure, I neglect to mention
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that the corporate and state dataveillant practices that underpin this composure actively rely on
the deindividualization of the user: the user, according to dataveillance, is less a person and more
an anonymous member of a demographic category. Examining this tension in more depth could
provide one fruitful area for further research. Additionally, in the introduction I describe the
body hailed by rhetorics of dematerialization as a ‘fantasy body of limitless mobility’ as one way
to gesture toward who this body is, but I quickly move past the classist, racist, and ableist
connotations of this ideal user. Focusing on “mobility” would be one way to remedy this. A
critique of mobility could, first, incorporate disability studies and theory asking questions like:
who is mobile? What does it mean for bodies that are immobile or not as mobile that iPhone
attempts to interpellate them as mobile? One way to perform this critique would be to focus on
iPhone’s poorly implemented accessibility features. Second, a critique of mobility could focus
also on the class valences of ‘mobility’ and define how iPhone represents, reproduces, and might
reinvent conceptions of so-called class mobility. This could easily move into a critique of race
and racism, when we consider how certain bodies are confined spatially and how the emptied
space might function differently for those bodies in spaces in which they are not typically
welcome.
Finally, vis-à-vis space, rhetorics of dematerialization reorganize proximal space into an
emptied space apparently devoid of historical and real spatial content and context. This space
provides the scene for other actualizations of the rhetorics of dematerialization. Constructed from
the complex contract between these emic, performed, actualizations and etic observation that
applies already existing cultural meanings to it, the emptied space allows for the delivery of a
kind of creative self-composure—but only within strictly defined limits. This means that it
operates primarily as mechanism of social control, by which apparent freedoms—here the
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freedom to creatively constitute one’s own self—are cynically constructed by corporate
dataveillance practices. While I do not wish to undermine the real affective experiences of selfsovereignty that iPhone permits, it is important to underline how iPhone allows for the deep
penetration of these practices into our everyday lives.
Sovereignty and Utopia
As Alexander Galloway and Eugene Thacker suggest, then, “network control is
unbothered by individuated subjects (subjected subjects). In fact. Individuated subjects are the
very producers and facilitators of networked control. Express yourself! Output some data!”224
Networked control—the sort that iPhone and the emptied space actualize—requires individuated
subjects. And how better to ensure that subjects are individuated than to outsource this
individuation on subjects themselves? This is precisely what performing attachment to iPhone in
the emptied space does. Users are each tasked with the creative performance of the self, but, with
iPhone, to perform in this way mandates that users accept that they will be on view—monitored,
tracked, and located. Additionally, this performance must remain within the available options
provisioned by iPhone. Even though iPhone ‘wants’ us
to believe that the gestures we use to perform (with) it
are purely expressive, they are in fact expressly and
specifically delimited. In parallel, to perform the self
as attached to iPhone is to remain within the
constraints set by iPhone. Selfies, for instance, have
been shown to be highly generic (figure 16); though
the generic composition might vary from city to city
Figure 16: New York’s ‘posegrid,’ from selfiecity.com
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or country to country, the fact remains that in specific locations the composition of selfies is very
similar.225 A practice that appears highly expressive—and one that exemplifies how we perform
the self in attachment to iPhone—is actually bound strongly to regional conventions. Voluntary
expression appears as something rather more conventional, and this expressive, self-composed
individual is revealed as one of many similarly self-composed individuals. Nevertheless, iPhone
and the rhetorics of dematerialization continue to push users to individualize themselves—or at
least to believe that they are.
This is similar to how some have described neoliberalism and its relation to the self.
Wendy Brown has described neoliberalism as “a governing rationality through which everything
is ‘economized’ and in a very specific way: human beings become market actors and nothing
but, every field of activity is seen as a market, and every entity […] is governed as a firm.” 226
This means that market rules penetrate aspects of life that they may have been barred from,
including even questions of ethics: “In markets, the good is generated by individual activity, not
by shared political deliberation and rule. And, where there are only individual capitals and
marketplaces, the demos, the people, do not exist.”227 Markets insist on the, not coincidentally,
self-determining, self-directed activity of individual actors. What is good is determined by what
is good for these individuals even over against other individuals, which means that neoliberalism
attempts to make collective action impossible. As Bryan McCann writes:
the neoliberal subject is one who is optimally autonomous from the influence of that state
and solely accountable for her/his actions…public discourse and pedagogical practices
normalize neoliberal logics in civil society at the expense of collective consciousness and
responsibility.228
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Individuals become responsible solely for themselves and to themselves, meaning that—
again not coincidentally—they must self-define, self-create, and be self-composed. Though she
does not explicitly link them to broader neoliberal logics, Dana Cloud’s conception of the
rhetorics of therapy might exemplify the neoliberal imperative to create the self. For her,
rhetorics of therapy are a trend in late 20th century political discourse, perhaps best exemplified
by the self-help movement, in which individuals are “exhorted to create one’s own success and
blamed personally for failure.”229 Though they recognize the structural problems created by
capitalism, they ultimately offload them onto individuals as psychological issues that one can
‘work through:’ “Therapeutic rhetorics must acknowledge ‘dis-ease,’ but they also hold the
individual or family responsible for the problem, thereby ignoring broader structures of
power.”230 This takes shape, often, as the construction of an “impulse to examine, express,
analyze, and improve one’s self.” 231 Performing attachment to iPhone, perhaps, takes cues from
these rhetorics of therapy—both demand that the individual express herself and both hide the
ways that this expression is tied to broader structures of power. If rhetorics of dematerialization
and the performances of attachment they script are ideological on a broad level insofar as they
create a projection of the device that allows the underlying processes of capitalism to remain
unchecked (even as dematerialization is proffered as a check on these processes), they emerge
here as ideological in a more specific sense. The structures of surveillant control that they
embody and actuate are hidden in their actuation, replaced by the impulse to self-compose and
expressively perform the self.
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This is a rather bleak picture. Even if, as I suggest in the introduction, the contradictions
of fetishism provide an untapped, if meager, foundation for micro-resistant practices (perhaps on
stylistic or purely critical grounds) these practices would remain tied to the structures of control
that enable them. It would be the individual who performs resistance, a resistance that must
remain inside the emptied space of control. Control itself would remain in place. Can there be
performances of resistance that strike directly at the heart of these structures of control, or even
at the capitalist system that makes them possible?
Fredric Jameson in “Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture” might help us provide one
answer. For him:
the works of mass culture cannot be ideological without at one and the same time being
implicitly or explicitly Utopian as well: they cannot manipulate unless they offer some
genuine shred of content as a fantasy bribe to the public about to be so manipulated.232
For works of mass culture (he examines the Godfather and Jaws) to operate as
ideological they must do so by “deflecting…the deepest and most fundamental hopes and
fantasies of the collectivity, to which they can therefore, no matter in how distorted a fashion, be
found to have given voice.”233 Hopes for a far-flung and better future are embedded in even the
most ideological texts, providing a utopian kernel as a ‘fantasy’ bribe that placates audiences.
Although it is crucial to resist the academic impulse toward what Dwight Conquergood calls
scriptocentrism,234 in which all cultural phenomena are read as if they are texts even if they are
resolutely non-textual, we might apply this conception of a utopia embedded in ideological
phenomena to the rhetorics of dematerialization, and especially to the performances of
attachment that are staged by the emptied space.
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For what could be more utopian—more like a non-place—than a space apparently
stripped of its content? What could have less content than a blank stage? Performances of
attachment, that is, already occur in a potentially utopian space. The emptied space is not simply
a space of surveillant control; it is also a space that offers a radical opportunity for the creation of
new social worlds determined by users. This is not to say that somehow performances of
attachment can be retooled for a more general political project. Neither is this to say that the
emptied space can automatically and uncritically function as a utopian stage. Both of these
would be also to accept the neoliberal logic of individualization that is packaged with the
emptied space. This is the critical mistake Zizi Papacharissi makes in A Private Sphere. Though
writing about social media rather than iPhone specifically, her conception of the internet’s
private sphere has parallels with my conception of the emptied space. She writes:
the values of autonomy, control, and expression…are generously afforded via SNSs
[social networking sites]. The technology enables expression, affords autonomy, and
enables control of the self and its multiple performances. At the same time, the
technology presupposes an aware and literate user who recognizes and can manage the
exposure his/her self-performance will receive.235
Like the emptied space, the internet’s private sphere requires users to perform an
expressive, controlled (and controllable) self. Papacharissi imagines, however, that this enables
users to engage in a new kind of political engagement. Essentially, her ‘private’ sphere is
opposed to a public sphere of collective, democratic debate; rather than creating a technologized
public sphere, the internet enables “a private, digitally enabled, intrusion on a public agenda
determined by others.”236 The digital citizen does not have to enter the public or even engage
with publicness to affect this public agenda—she “is alone, but not lonely or isolated. The citizen
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is connected and operates in a mode and with a political language determined by him or her.”237
We might ask, first, how a digitally connected citizen can develop a political language on her
own; if this is even possible (and, to be clear, I do not think it is), further, could such a language
even be legible as political to others? And if this language is not legible as political, how could it
then come to affect the public agenda? Further, what sort of democracy is this? Digital citizens
can ‘affect’ the public agenda after its invention, but still seem to have no say about its invention.
The public agenda is created somewhere beyond the reach of the digitally connected citizen, who
only reads about it after it has already come into effect. The individuated user exists in a purely
reactive or responsive mode—she can only comment on the public agenda. This is not a model
of democratic deliberation in which the digital citizen helps to create the public agenda, then.
Instead, the public agenda is already given, and the digital citizen’s participation is limited to an
epiphenomenal world of online discourse that concerns the public agenda but does not constitute
it. In my view, this is because Papacharissi uncritically embraces a neoliberal logic of
individualism. Indeed, she writes, “the citizen is able to become an agonist of democracy, if
needed, but in an atomized mode.”238 An atomized mode: hyper-individualized and alone, yet
mysteriously connected, the digitally connected citizen affects democracy through her selfdefined political language. Without leaving the comfort of her computer chair, she individually
engages with an already intact public agenda: she takes individual responsibility for structural
problems, which disassembles the potential for collective action. If democracy on the internet
requires atomization, that is, it is a democracy that can be only slightly effectual, at best.
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Although I am not saying that such individual actions on the internet are completely
useless, I do think that because these actions must accept neoliberal individualization they help
to reproduce and reify the structures that insist on it. The emptied space certainly does insist on
this individualization, but read from a utopian perspective, it might be possible to recognize a
democratic desire for self-rule within performances of self-composure. Wendy Brown says,
“democracy requires that citizens be modestly oriented toward self-rule, not simply value
enhancement, and that we understand our freedom as resting in such self-rule, not simply in
market conduct.”239 Self-composure is value enhancement, and the emptied space requires this.
Users, today, have social media ‘brands’ and social media ‘capital’ and this all adds up to a
conception of self-worth as social value. But the rapid acceptance of the practices of selfcomposure made possible by the emptied space also points to their utopian potential: a desire for
self-rule and, perhaps, for a democracy that is founded on individual sovereignty, which might
take shape as a self-determination rather than a merely aesthetic self-composure. But, critically,
to harness this utopian potential for any kind of broader political project, it would be necessary to
resist the atomization that is packaged with the emptied space. There are, that is, others in the
emptied space with you, who are all performing attachment similarly to or differently from you.
It might not be necessary to throw away your iPhone—and, in fact, it might in some ways that
this thesis has attempted to outline be better to keep it—in order adequately resist the control it
implements. Instead, retooling self-composure as self-rule mandates, primarily, a thinking of the
emptied as space as empty and full, mediated and live, and individual and collective. If we are
alone in the emptied space as empty—if we operate as a digital citizen in an enclosed, private
sphere—we are with others in the emptied space as full. We toggle between both, carrying

239

“Booked #3.”

126

usable elements between them. Because of this, the social worlds we create in the emptied space
are never created alone. They manifest, instead, out of collective hopes and fantasies that through
the emptied space can be shared, seen, and extended beyond local spatial limitations. If we are to
have self-rule in the emptied space, and if that self-rule is to extend beyond the emptied space, it
can only be through a recognition that self-rule must be founded on these collective, utopian
hopes.
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